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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
In 1999, Wendy Shalit, a twenty-three year-old Williams College graduate, 
argued for something rather unheard of in a culture saturated with scantily clad pop 
stars and promiscuity. She states in A Return to Modesty: Discovering the Lost Virtue 
that young women today are not in need of more liberation, but rather a “good dose of 
sexist upbringing.”1  Offering more than just a provocative catchphrase, Shalit stands 
by this conservative ideology. She warns that American women not only face higher 
rates of rape, depression, and lower self-esteem than in years past, but alsoclaims that 
“we have lost sight of what is truly beautiful in women,” mostly because female 
modesty is roundly denounced as sexist and repressive to women.2 Women can only 
benefit, Shalit argues, when they accept the sexist view that they are uniquely 
compromised by the ethics of the sexual revolution and embrace sexual modesty as 
the only answer to solving the problems that feminism simply cannot fix.3  
As she argues for sexism, she also denounces feminism and feminists for 
misleading women. For instance, she rejects the views of feminists like Simone de 
Beauvoir, Andrea Dworkin, and Judith Butler, who argue that differences between 
men and women are socially constructed.4 They define sexism as a repressive power; 
yet, as she claims, it is their ideology that really harms women, as “any page of The 
                                                 
1
 Wendy Shalit, A Return to Modesty: Discovering the Lost Virtue (New York: The Free Press, 1999), 
153. 
2
 Ibid., 143. 
3
 Ibid., 39-57, 106-17, 226-23. 
4
 Ibid., 38, 87, 107. 
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Second Sex or The Feminine Mystique [contains] more misogyny than in the writings 
of Aristotle and Norman Mailer combined.”5 In order to halt the misogyny rampant in 
American culture, Shalit argues that women need to stop acting like men and start 
nurturing their femininity.6  Not only should they embrace their natural femininity, 
but if they start covering up and stop giving in to the hook-up scene, women are 
going to bring about honorable changes in men as well.7   
Shalit’s book received a fair amount of support and attention, 8 yet also 
elicited some reviews which were extremely opposed to Shalit’s argument for 
sexism.9  Shalit’s second book, Girls Gone Mild: Young Women Reclaim Self-Respect 
and Find It’s Not Bad to Be Good, was released in 2007 and is a startling departure 
from A Return to Modesty. Shalit made a tactical decision in Girls Gone Mild to 
appropriate a former enemy, feminism. This marks a radical rhetorical shift in three 
respects. First, she claims modesty is fourth-wave feminism, a new wave of “nice 
                                                 
5
 Ibid., 142. 
6
 Ibid., 237. 
7
 Ibid., 146. 
8
 "Modern Girls and the Modesty Movement," National Public Radio  (2007), "Girls Gone Mild?," 
ABC News, July 20 2007, "Teen Girls Embrace a New Fashion Trend: Modesty," Hannah Sampson 
McClatchy Newspapers, 25 October 2007, "Modesty Zone,"  http://www.modestyzone.net/, "Modestly 
Yours,"  http://blogs.modestlyyours.net/, Pia Catton, "A Modest Rebellion," The Wall Street Journal 
Online  (2007), Tamala M. Edwards, "Modestly Provocative," Time, March 1 1999, Florence King, "A 
Return to Modesty," National Review, January 25 1999, Gilbert Meilaender, "A New Sexual 
Revolution: The Case for Modesty," Christian Century, March 3 1999, Paula Rinehart, "Losing Our 
Promiscuity," Christianity Today, July 10 2000, Zenya Sirant, "Girls Gone Mild," Flare, December 1 
2007, Lauren F. Winner, "Proud to Be Modest," Christianity Today, January 10 2000, Randall 
Patterson, "Students of Virginity," The New York Times, March 30 2008, George F. Will, "Modesty Is 
Sexy. Really.," Newsweek, February 1 1999. 
9
 Thomas J. Gerschick, "Book Reviews," Men and Masculinities 2, no. 4 (2000), Jonah Goldberg, 
"Conservatism without History," Reason Magazine  (1999), 
http://www.reason.com/news/show/30981.html, Kim Phillips-Fein, "Feminine Mystiquers," Nation 
268, no. 12 (1999), Katha Pollitt, "Bookend; the Solipsisters," New York Times Book Review 1999, 
Wendy Shalit and Cathy Young, "Should Women Be More Modest?," Slate.com  (1999), 
http://www.slate.com/id/18420/entry/18424/, Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, "Victoria's Secret," 
Commonweal 126, no. 4 (1999). 
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girls” revolting against the immodest “bad girl” message of a culture that glorifies 
Girls Gone Wild, sluts, and alcohol-blurred hookups.10  Second, she differentiates the 
“fourth wave” from second and third-wave feminism, designating these feminisms as 
harmful. Finally, Shalit completely drops the advocacy of sexism.  
The author who declared, “the need is not for nonsexist upbringing, but for 
precisely a good dose of sexist upbringing”11 seems vastly different from the one who 
said eight years later, “feminism is clearly alive for young women,” so much so that 
she speculated, “a new fourth wave of feminism really will take off.”12 For Shalit to 
commit this rhetorical about-face not only appears to be contradictory, but also seems 
as though it would cause her audience to completely discredit her. Yet, just the 
opposite happened: not only did Shalit gain wide acclaim for her first book, but her 
audience was even more receptive to her second work, responding with reviews that 
may have still questioned her argument, but were not anywhere as harsh as the 
response to A Return to Modesty. As criticism for Girls Gone Mild was far less severe 
than that of A Return to Modesty, this bewildering success is the impetus to this study: 
an effort to understand the rhetorical strategies by which Shalit argued for modesty in 
A Return to Modesty, how she shifted her argument in Girls Gone Mild, and what 
barriers it overcame. 
I contend that Shalit subtly altered her rhetorical strategy in order to overcome 
barriers within her audience that limited her audience for A Return to Modesty. She 
                                                 
10
 Wendy Shalit, Girls Gone Mild: Young Women Reclaim Self-Respect and Find It's Not Bad to Be 
Good (New York: Random House, 2007), 3-18, 25-30. 
11
 Shalit, A Return to Modesty: Discovering the Lost Virtue, 153. 
12
 ———, Girls Gone Mild: Young Women Reclaim Self-Respect and Find It's Not Bad to Be Good, 
235, 36. 
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changed her strategy from arguing for real definitions to arguing for what I call 
founders’ intent. Whereas real definitions hold that there is an objective reality, true 
“essences” which can be known though language, arguing for founders’ intent shifts 
from an abstract, immaterial focus to an appeal to an original or prototype rooted in a 
particular time and place as the standard authority; in this case, first wave feminism. 
This shift in focus is the critical difference between arguing for real definitions versus 
founders’ intent. Both strategies, however, operate to redefine via dissociation, a 
strategy by which a rhetor must redefine a word by arguing that the common 
understanding of a word is erroneous and misleading. Consequently, she or he will 
argue for what a word means with recourse to the standard and authority of the 
original. In doing so, Shalit was able to overcome some of the criticism and 
limitations to her initial argument for her second book. My analysis not only attempts 
to explain the strange success Shalit has enjoyed, which I believe she achieved 
through argument for founders’ intent, but also informs rhetorical theory, in that it 
illustrates the strategic advantages inherent within arguing for founders’ intent, versus 
arguing for real definitions.  
Review of Literature 
To date, there has been no scholarly examination of Shalit’s work aside from a 
book review of A Return to Modesty in the journal Men and Masculinities.13 This 
review was no different than other popular press reviews of the book, as it was mostly 
critical of Shalit’s views of history and men, but not entirely unsympathetic to her 
                                                 
13
 Gerschick, "Book Reviews." 
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argument. Shalit’s work prompted a considerable amount of popular coverage, and 
reviews coming from both renowned critics and anonymous readers provide valuable 
insight in the examination of Shalit’s texts. On one hand, reviewers have scathing 
criticism for her views of gender and historical representations, while some have also 
commended her ability to dissect cultural constraints facing women who supposedly 
live in a liberated society. Tracing the criticism that followed her books reveals 
considerable barriers Shalit seems to have responded to when she wrote Girls Gone 
Mild. I draw upon these reviews in assessing her argumentative strategies in chapters 
three and four. 
Examining Shalit’s work is important not only because she is an unlikely 
popular figure, but her work also informs rhetorical theory, specifically concerning 
arguments of definition. Several scholars are particularly helpful to my study: David 
Zarefsky, Edward Schiappa, Chaïm Perelman, and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca. Their 
work on arguments for real definition lays the theoretical groundwork for this project 
and is particularly useful for my examination of A Return to Modesty. Arguing for 
real definitions is similar to, but distinctly different from the strategy that Shalit 
employs in Girls Gone Mild, a strategy that calls for the development of new theory. 
In developing the theoretical principles behind arguing for founders’ intent, I look 
largely to Perelman and Olbretchs-Tyteca and Robert Natelson. These authors offer 
the elements which serve as a framework for examining the advantages and 
limitations of arguing for founders’ intent, as they are extremely helpful.  
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Methodology 
Several questions arise in response to Shalit’s work: how does she argue for 
sexism? How does she seek to make it attractive to a secular audience? How does she 
appropriate feminism after taking an anti-feminist stance? In order to find an answer 
to these questions, I completed a rhetorical analysis of A Return to Modesty and Girls 
Gone Mild. This necessitates some clarification: within this thesis, I assess Shalit’s 
rhetorical strategies, not her ideology. My objective is to foreground Shalit’s 
arguments and the strategies behind them with little, if any, critical commentary. As I 
read A Return to Modesty and Girls Gone Mild, I found myself in complete 
agreement with some of Shalit’s views and in complete disagreement with others. 
However, I do not entertain questions such as, “what are the repercussions of this 
ideology,” “who is excluded,” “what are the assumptions of this argument?” 
Engaging these questions and further investigating Shalit’s ideology promises to be a 
rich area of development, given her conservative position in a Girls Gone Wild 
society. I do believe that her ideology could be quite liberating for some; however, 
much of Shalit’s rhetoric gives me pause, if not grave concern, as to whether or not 
these ideas could be extremely harmful to others. In any case, I refrain from making 
any sort of judgment as to whether Shalit is offering a panacea or placebo for women 
today.  
This study will illuminate her primary argumentative strategies, how her 
arguments attempt to negotiate the barriers to her work, as well as demonstrate the 
limitations therein. This method is an appropriate answer to the question posed by 
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Shalit’s rhetoric: why does she appropriate a former enemy, feminism, for her defense 
of modesty and how does she do so?  With a careful study of each text, I contend 
Shalit shifted her rhetorical strategies to overcome criticism of her first book, and in 
doing so, garnered far less opposition to Girls Gone Mild. She accomplished this by 
arguing for founders’ intent, versus arguing for real definitions as she did in A Return 
to Modesty. Shalit argued in A Return to Modesty that sexism, not feminism, is really 
liberating and did so by drawing upon the practices of conservative religion. 
However, she changes her strategy in Girls Gone Mild: feminism, which she had 
previously vilified, is now a stand-in for her ideology of modesty. In order to align 
modesty with feminism, Shalit argues for founders’ intent: the first wave feminists 
best represented the spirit of feminism, as they based their arguments for women’s 
rights in moral values. Shalit recognizes that these values are being revived in 
“fourth-wave feminism” a new kind of feminism that returns to the first wave. She 
then seeks to dissociate second and third-wave feminism from liberation, and casts 
these ideologies as antithetical to the original purpose of feminism. By making 
feminism congruent with, rather than opposed to, her interpretation of modesty, Shalit 
is able to appropriate a former enemy for her own means, overcoming much of the 
criticism she faced with A Return to Modesty, and is able to reach a much wider 
audience than when she advocated for sexism through conservative practices. 
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Summary of Chapters 
Chapter two, “The Rhetoric of Definitions and the Definition of Feminism(s) 
in the 90s,” lays out the theoretical framework and historical context of this work. In 
the following chapter, “A Return to Limitations: Arguing for Real Definitions of 
Sexism and Modesty,” I examine Shalit’s argument for real definitions within A 
Return to Modesty. In order to advance her defense of modesty, Shalit attempts to 
dissociate sexism from its negative connotations, arguing that sexism is truly 
liberating for women as she gives examples from history and conservative religious 
traditions. However, it becomes evident from the audience reviews that this 
argumentative strategy had severe limitations. If Shalit wanted to overcome these 
limitations, she had to adapt her argument. Investigating her new strategy within Girls 
Gone Mild is the focus of my fourth chapter, “‘Mild(er)’ Criticism: Arguing for 
Founders’ Intent.” While Shalit seems to be arguing for real definitions as she did in 
her previous book, analysis reveals a critical difference in strategy, which I deem 
arguing for founders’ intent. Shalit appropriates feminism and uses “fourth-wave 
feminism” as a label for her ideology of modesty. To do so, she claims that the first 
wave of feminism, which struggled for the dignity and humanity of women through 
modesty and activism, is the best way to achieve liberation for women. The fourth 
wave of feminism has revived this standard of the first wave, and compared to the 
potentially dangerous ideologies of the second and third wave, is the best way for 
women to achieve liberation and equality. In “Modesty for the Masses: Implications 
and Conclusion,” the fifth and final chapter of my thesis, I examine how this case 
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study of Shalit’s work not only helps to explain her curious success, but also 
examines the theoretical implications of arguing for founders’ intent. 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Rhetoric of Definitions and the Definitions of Feminism(s) in the 90s 
 
Shalit’s main argumentative strategies concern definitions. Within A Return to 
Modesty, Shalit is largely focused on dissociating negative connotations from 
modesty in order to argue that what is perceived as sexist is in fact truly liberating for 
women as opposed to predominant feminist ideologies. In Girls Gone Mild, she is 
concerned with defining a new wave of feminism and dissociating second and third-
wave feminism from liberation. Discussions of real definitions from Zarefsky, 
Schiappa, and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca are particularly relevant for my 
critique of her first book. However, this scholarship cannot fully account for Shalit’s 
argumentative strategy within her second book. For this reason, I develop a theory of 
argument for founders’ intent. 
Just as a review of scholarship on definitions is necessary for this project, 
situating Shalit’s work in a larger historical context is also helpful. Providing a brief 
sketch of what third-wave feminism was at the time of Shalit’s writing is not only 
helpful in determining her ideological position, which was often diametrically 
opposed to many popular-press feminist writers, but is also a vivid illustration of the 
larger definitional wars over feminism going on at this time. Part of the reason why 
Shalit is able to appropriate a former enemy is because, at this time more than any 
other, feminism lacked a clear definition. While some writers, such as bell hooks, 
were very upset that feminism had become devoid of meaning, others saw this as a 
11 
 
way to be inclusive of a mulitiplicity of lifestyles and viewpoints. More specifically, 
Shalit directly engages and debates particular feminist ideologies in A Return to 
Modesty and Girls Gone Mild. Popular-press feminist authors such as Camille Paglia, 
Naomi Wolf, Katie Roiphe, and Christina Hoff Sommers are most pertinent to 
Shalit’s work, as these are the authors whose ideas Shalit challenges with her defense 
of modesty, but they were also arguing for a particular definition of feminism. The 
intent is to situate Shalit’s rhetoric by examining the discourse which served as both 
exigency and enemy within A Return to Modesty and Girls Gone Mild.  
The Rhetoric of Definitions 
The primary means through which Shalit argues for sexism, modesty, and 
fourth-wave feminism is through definition. I contend that the less critical reaction to 
Shalit’s second book can be credited to a shift in argumentative strategies between 
her two books. In A Return to Modesty, it is clear that she is arguing for real 
definitions. Real definitions are claims to the true essence of something. For example, 
as Shalit argues for the real definition of sexism, she works to dissociate sexism from 
negative connotations and associate it with positive ones representative of what she 
claims sexism truly is, a key strategy in arguing for real definitions. While it seems as 
though she is continuing to argue for real definitions in Girls Gone Mild, instead, 
Shalit changes her strategy to argue for founders’ intent. This strategy rejects the 
notion of true essence. For example, feminism simply does not have a single true 
definition; when Shalit was writing, feminism could be “anything.” However, Shalit 
gains ammunition for her case when she argues that the whole point of feminism is 
12 
 
liberation for women, as best exemplified by the first-wavers. From this interpretation 
of first wave feminism, Shalit concludes that her ideology of modesty is the best way 
to achieve liberation, rebellion in the way the founders of feminism intended. By 
holding up the first wave feminists as women who embodied empowering modesty, 
Shalit argues that fourth-wave feminism carries on this standard of liberation for 
women. 
Shalit continually frames her arguments in A Return to Modesty and Girls 
Gone Mild in terms of asserting what sexism, modesty, or feminism means; however, 
she seeks to find the meaning of these contested terms through different strategies. 
First, I discuss the strategy of real definitions, which function to further an essentialist 
argument through dissociation. It is important to recognize the limitations that 
scholarship holds to be inherent within arguments for real definition, as well. It is 
because of these limitations that Shalit may have chosen to modify her strategy. 
Therefore, I offer a theory of argument for founders’ intent in order to account for the 
argumentative shift between A Return to Modesty and Girls Gone Mild, a strategy 
which is in part responsible for negotiating the rhetorical limitations of her first book. 
More than just a de facto explanation of meaning, definitions “themselves are 
arguments,” as Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbretchs-Tyteca offer.1 Similarly, David 
Zarefsky states, “a persuasive definition is a non-neutral characterization that conveys 
a positive or negative attitude about something.”2 Most importantly, “all those who 
                                                 
1
 Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation 
(Notre Dame, [Ind.]: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), 213. 
2
 David Zarefsky, "Strategic Maneuvering through Persuasive Definitions: Implications for Dialectic 
and Rhetoric," Argumentation 20, no. 4 (2006): 404. 
13 
 
argue in favor of a particular definition want it, through some slant or other, to 
influence the use which would probably have been made of the concept had they not 
intervened.”3 While definitions can mean the way a word is used, or how a word 
should be understood in a particular case, I am concerned with the rhetoric of real 
definitions, or essentialist definitions; that is, definitions that purport to offer the 
“true” meaning, versus a common but false understanding of a word. 
The idea that there are true meanings is a very old one. Plato’s Phaedrus is 
noted for the allegory of Ideal Forms, and it is “the belief that words are somehow 
related to essences of Ideal Forms [that] fuels the search for definition; therefore, a 
real definition of a word is the one that accurately depicts what is ‘essential’ about a 
word’s referent.”4 Belief in Ideal Forms begets the “language of essentialism” which 
“refers to linguistic habits that reflect and depend on metaphysical absolutism,” that 
things, values, or ideas somehow have “essences that are knowable ‘in themselves.’”5 
Despite the influence of postmodernism, the search for true meaning has not been 
completely abandoned. In his investigation of Supreme Court cases over the 
definition of golf, and debates over what constitutes a living person, Schiappa states, 
“the language of essentialism and metaphysical realism persists in the social arenas 
outside of the confines of professional philosophy.”6 Thus, the struggle to bring these 
real definitions into being can be identified in many political conflicts today, such as 
the definition of marriage. 
                                                 
3
 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, 213. 
4
 Edward Schiappa, Defining Reality: Definitions and the Politics of Meaning (Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 2003), 36. 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Ibid., 43. 
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Shalit focuses her argument on a search for the real definitions of sexism and 
modesty. When I refer to “real definition,” I operate with Schiappa’s understanding 
that it is an effort “to define things rather than words, that is, facts of essence rather 
than facts of usage.”7 It is clear from Shalit’s argument for sexism that she must 
contend with “competing answers to questions of the form ‘What is X?’”8 Questions 
about the real nature of things are often prompted by a rift in understanding. For 
example, “when someone feels that the ‘proper’ meaning of the word is no longer 
correct,” it may prompt the introduction of “novel definitions.”9 Schiappa explains 
that these novel definitions come into play “when a person feels that the dominant 
mundane definition (formal or informal) is wrong or unhelpful,” and in offering a 
novel definition, he or she hopes to “change other people’s understanding and 
linguistic behavior away from the conventional patterns and toward new behaviors 
and understanding.”10 Of course, novel definitions could very well be an attempt to 
get at what the word “really is,” seeking to correct erroneous usage in order to reflect 
more accurately what “the defining qualities of the referent ‘really’ and ‘objectively’ 
are.”11 
Naturally, arguments of this kind bring together conflicting ideas, and one 
struggling for a real definition must employ “dissociation” as part of their 
argumentative strategy. Schiappa’s explanation of dissociation is further elaborated 
within The New Rhetoric: a Treatise on Argumentation. Chaïm Perelman and Lucie 
                                                 
7
 Ibid., 35. 
8
 Ibid., 36. 
9
 Ibid., 31. 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Ibid., 35. 
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Olbretchs-Tyteca explain that someone arguing for a real definition must reestablish 
“a coherent vision of reality,” which entails wrenching loose the erroneous meaning 
from the word.12 This is critical in that “reality is governed by the principle of 
noncontradiction and cannot simultaneously, and in the same relationship, have and 
not have a given property.”13  
Perelman and Tyteca employ “term I” and “term II” in order to explain 
dissociation. “Term I” represents the “apparent, to what occurs in the first instance, to 
what is actual, immediate, and known directly,” in other words, what would be a 
common, but erroneous meaning of a word. The “real definition,” understood as 
“term II,” must then be contrasted to “term I” and in doing so, gets “rid of the 
incompatibilities that may appear between different aspects of term I.”  It is the 
interplay between these two terms that creates dissociation:  
Term II provides a criterion, a norm which allows us to distinguish 
those aspects of term I which are of value from those which are not; it 
is not simply a datum, it is a construction which, during the 
dissociation of term I, establishes a rule that makes it possible to 
classify the multiple aspects of term I in a hierarchy. It enables those 
that do not correspond to the rule which reality provides to be termed 
illusory, erroneous, or apparent.14 
                                                 
12
 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, 126. 
13
 Ibid., 127. 
14
 Ibid. 
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In comparison between the two, it is term II that stands as “normative and 
explanatory,” such that it is “possible to retain or to disqualify the various aspects 
under which term I is presented.”15 Of course, since “term II is never known 
directly,” this “attempt to communicate it discursively may be regarded as a 
definition of the term, that is, an expression of the criteria that will enable us to 
determine it.”16 As Schiappa states, arguing for a real definition “breaks X into two 
referents: X is really Y; it only appears to be not-Y.”17 In other words, a rhetor’s 
efforts to define the real meaning of a word must not only entail dissociating 
erroneous connotations from a word, but also associating a word with its “true” 
meaning.  
This effort to realign the audience’s understanding via dissociation to the 
rhetor’s vision of a real definition is not without problems. Scholars point out that 
essential definitions are often troublesome because they fail “to account for the 
variability of human experience,” and so the “linguistic absolutism fails to account 
for partiality of language.”18 It would be incredibly difficult to persuade an audience, 
especially as diverse an audience as the readers of Shalit’s work, to agree on a single 
definition of sexism, feminism, or modesty. As much as one may try to dissociate a 
term from a particular meaning, there are still limits to the meaning that a word may 
                                                 
15
 Ibid., 128. 
16
 Ibid., 445. 
17
 Schiappa, Defining Reality: Definitions and the Politics of Meaning, 37. 
18
 Edward Schiappa, Defining Reality : Definitions and the Politics of Meaning (Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 2003), 41. 
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conceivably have.19 Another pitfall of real definitions is the potential of fallacy. As 
Schiappa states, when a rhetor “uses dissociation to contrast one definition with an 
inferior one, there is an important sense in which the defense of the ‘realness’ of 
one’s definition is circular,” that is, after having defined what X really is, “then of 
course rival definitions merely represent what X merely appears to be.”20 Given the 
limitations of arguing for real definitions, immense variation in audiences, and risk of 
circular argument, Schiappa contends that arguing for real definitions should be 
abandoned for arguing what a word means in a particular context or in a utilitarian 
sense, such as what definition would best serve the interests of the audience.21 
 These were precisely the pitfalls that Shalit encountered in response to A 
Return to Modesty. Even though many had praised the book, it also elicited criticism 
that could not be ignored. Shalit’s efforts to dissociate sexism with negative 
connotations simply failed with a good portion of reviewers. Therefore, if Shalit was 
going to persist in her defense of modesty, she had to find a strategy that would 
overcome these limitations, a strategy which I believe is a modification of, but 
distinct from, argument for real definitions. 
Argument for Founders’ Intent 
It seems as though whenever questions over the Constitution arise, be it over 
the right to bear arms, the separation of church and state, or the definition of 
marriage, “founders’ intent” or “original intent” becomes a common refrain for those 
                                                 
19
 David Zarefsky, "Definitions," in Argument in a Time of Change: Definitions, Frameworks, and 
Critiques, ed. James F. Klumpp (Annandale: National Communication Association, 1997), 4. 
20
 Schiappa, Defining Reality: Definitions and the Politics of Meaning, 43. 
21
 Ibid., 168. 
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arguing for a conservative position. The same argument also appears in Parliamentary 
debate when the interpretation of a resolution is called into question: the government 
or opposition team may contend that their definition of a contested resolution is in-
line with what they offer as the original authority and therefore should be the 
preferred definition. I borrow the term “founders’ intent” from these contexts. 
Although arguing for founders’ intent is nothing new, the rhetorical maneuvers 
committed when one argues for founders’ intent have not been fully articulated within 
existing theory. Furthermore, examining this argumentative appeal in context of 
Shalit’s work is particularly informative to rhetorical theory, as I believe her use of 
this strategy aided her in overcoming limitations to her initial argument for real 
definitions in A Return to Modesty.  
Argument for founders’ intent is similar to, but critically different from, 
argument for real definitions. The distinction to be made is this: real definitions argue 
for essences; that is, maintaining that there is a true “ideal” form of X. However, 
when one argues for founders’ intent, she or he does not hold to such absolutes. 
Instead, given the ambiguity of language, a rhetor will argue that X was best 
embodied by a material origin, which set the standard for all Xs to follow. This 
material origin may be understood as a prototype, the original of a particular object, 
or the example set by the founders. In this case, according to an understanding of 
what the founders believed X to be or enacted through practices, a rhetor will then 
argue what current practice can best meet this understanding.  
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I do not believe that current scholarship fully articulates the strategy that 
Shalit employs within Girls Gone Mild. However, I would maintain that some 
preexisting concepts are useful and aid in my construction of this theory. Primarily, 
arguing for founders’ intent entails granting authority to a particular origin, an idea 
which is discussed within The New Rhetoric. For example, Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca describe locus of essence as a focus not on a “metaphysical attitude which 
affirms the superiority of the essence…but the fact of according a higher value to 
individuals to the extent that they embody this essence.”22 Whereas real definitions 
would hold to more abstract conceptualizations, locus of essence has a much more 
material focus. In other words, an Angus heifer judged at the county fair is not going 
to be awarded Grand Champion because she is the Ideal Angus heifer, but rather 
because she comes closest to the standards of the Angus breed compared to all the 
competing Angus heifers present in the same arena, or, as Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca might declare, she wins because she exhibits a “superiority” which “best 
incarnates the essence.”23 Despite the claims of over-confident 4-Hers, an Ideal 
Angus heifer will never exist because there would be no way to compare all the 
Angus heifers that are living or have ever lived, nor would it be possible for there to 
be complete agreement as to which beast best incarnates this standard. However, 
given a set of preexisting standards of the Angus breed, individual animals may be 
subjectively judged as close representations of these standards. 
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Within arguments for founders’ intent, this locus of essence is joined to a 
locus of quality. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca conceptualize locus of quality as that 
which regards an original source as “a higher reality, as a model, as determining the 
extreme possibility of a line of development.”24 Again, one who argues for locus of 
quality would assert that the first of X set the standard for all subsequent Xs. For 
example, in the Lutheran Church Missouri Synod, arguments for the ordination of 
women are often countered with St. Paul’s exhortation in I Corinthians 14:34 for 
women to be silent and submissive in church. This debate over women’s ordination 
centers on the question, “What is a pastor?” This denomination places utmost 
importance on the precedents set by the early church or Martin Luther, so many argue 
women’s ordination would be inconsistent with the way that worship services were 
first conducted. A high value is placed on maintaining tradition, striving to remain 
consistent with the original example. Anything new is not innovation, but rather a 
deviation from the original. Arguments for founders’ intent combine both this focus 
on essence and quality, as it fixes a material origin as both the authority and the 
standard for all subsequent manifestations. 
Arguing for founders’ intent entails not only fixing a material origin as 
authority and deducing the standards implicit therein, but also entails some 
interpretive footwork. Just as the Lutheran church cannot worship exactly as the early 
Christians did, founders’ intent assumes a measure of non-literal interpretation. This 
is never more evident than within the argumentative appeals concerning the 
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interpretation and/or execution of the Constitution. Even during the time of the 
Founding Fathers, there were debates concerning founders’ intent. For example, a 
treason case from the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in 1782 found all eight 
judges rejecting arguments for literal interpretation of the state constitution, instead 
deciding that “the ‘spirit’ (underlying intent) of the constitution should govern.”25 A 
judge on that case “argued for construction ‘according to the spirit and not by the 
words of the constitution,’” which seems to reflect an understanding that following a 
document or original example to the letter is impossible. Instead, one must seek to 
deduce the underlying purpose, which relies upon more material, contemporary 
understanding.26  
I contend that arguing for founders’ intent is a fusion of these three principles: 
locus of essence, locus of quality, and non-literal interpretation. First, operating from 
founders’ intent means to acknowledge that the principles expressed by a material 
origin should be a standard for all subsequent manifestations. However, these 
principles should not be interpreted and practiced literally, but must be achieved in a 
fashion fitting the times. Second, arguing for founders’ intent employs dissociation in 
shifting an audience’s understanding from an erroneous definition to one aligned with 
what a rhetor contends was the original definition. Third, while using dissociation to 
alter an audience’s understanding makes founders’ intent similar to real definitions, 
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arguing for founders’ intent means to reject material attainment of perfection, or, in 
other words, a rejection of Platonic, idealized language. 
As illustrated by a case study of Shalit’s work, I articulate a theory of 
argument for founders’ intent based on elements within Perelman and Olbretchs-
Tyteca and Natelson’s work. Shalit strategically aligned feminism with modesty, yet 
she could not proclaim “modesty is feminism!” given her previous anti-feminist 
stance, to say nothing of the ideological clash between modesty and other third-wave 
feminisms that could hardly be called modest. So, Shalit utilized a strategy of arguing 
for founders’ intent. When arguing as such, one seeks first to first designate a material 
origin as authority and standard; in this case, Shalit appeals to first wave feminism as 
the best incarnation of feminism. Second, one must determine the standard set by the 
original or underlying “spirit;” in Girls Gone Mild, Shalit argues that liberation for 
women and activism is the spirit undergirding feminism, something vividly enacted 
by the first wave feminists’ activism and moral standards. Finally, given an 
interpretation of founders’ intent, one argues the best way to enact that in a 
contemporary way, as Shalit argues that her ideology of modesty is the best way to 
achieve the original intentions of feminism. Given the argument for founders’ intent, 
one may also compare this to competing ideologies, stating that they are not 
consistent, or at least are not as beneficial, just as Shalit argues that second and third 
wave feminists have advocated some very un-liberating practices.  
 While the limitations to this kind of argumentation might seem similar to 
arguing for real definitions, arguing for founders’ intent is in fact far less restrictive in 
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that it allows for greater ambiguity and can be more inclusive of a larger audience. In 
making this shift, Shalit was able to get away from the restrictive understanding of 
modesty she argues for in A Return to Modesty, and while still maintaining her 
conservatism, she made modesty much broader and more accessible to her audience 
by constructing it as the best means to achieve the principle objective of feminism, 
women’s liberation. 
 
The Struggle for Definition in Third-wave feminism 
Perhaps part of the reason why Shalit resorted to arguing for founders’ intent 
is due to the state of feminism at the time she wrote. The second wave movement of 
the 1960s and 1970s had largely dissipated by the 80s, and feminists and non-
feminists alike were wondering what feminism had done or failed to do, and what, if 
anything, was left to do for the women’s movement. The late 80s and 90s were a 
strange time for feminism, in that a paradox arose: increasingly diverse ideologies 
were presented as “feminism,” yet fewer women identified as feminists. This paradox 
is evident with the literature at this time, which reveals three overriding concerns. 
First, feminism was losing its definition, or rather, fraught with too many definitions. 
Second, even though definitions of feminism were multiplying, fewer were 
identifying themselves as feminists. Finally, because fewer identified as feminists, 
those who did perceived that feminism was in crisis. While uniting people around a 
single definition of feminism at this time was unthinkable, it also opened up the 
possibility of anyone defining feminism as whatever she or he wished it to be. It is 
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precisely this principle that many popular press feminist writers, such as Camille 
Paglia, Katie Roiphe, Naomi Wolf, and Christina Hoff Sommers, took advantage of 
in offering their take on “what is feminism?” 
Feminism has always been notoriously difficult to define.27  Writer and 
journalist Rebecca West stated in the early twentieth century, “I myself have never 
been able to find out precisely what feminism is: I only know that people call me a 
feminist whenever I express sentiments that differentiate me from a doormat.”28  This 
pithy saying pinpoints the long-standing problem with feminism: most seem to 
understand the “gist” of feminism, but a unified definition has always proved elusive. 
Exactly what those sentiments may be has varied immensely over the history of the 
feminist movement within the United States, and also been a source of much 
contention within the movement.  
 While navigating feminist ideologies is daunting, theorists have tried to offer 
some general definitions. bell hooks has defined feminism as “a movement to end 
sexism, sexist exploitation, and oppression,” but this definition is far from the only 
one. 29  As Chris Beasley states, “concise definitions of feminism clearly presume that 
all the varieties of feminist thought are perceived to have some common ground—that 
is, women have had and continue to have a rough deal because of their sex.” 30  She 
goes on to explain that “feminists obviously do not concur on why ‘the deal’ for 
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women was and is rough, whether different women might receive different ‘deals’ or 
about what might be done to alter their situation.” 31  At best, feminism is “a kind of 
empty shell into which may be poured any number of different concerns, details and 
explanations.”32  In rhetorical studies, Karen Foss, Sonja Foss, and Cindy Griffith 
filled this “empty shell” definition in several ways. For instance, some forms of 
feminism “focus on the concept of equity, with a goal of reorganizing society on the 
basis of equality for the sexes in all areas of social relations,” while other feminists 
desire “alternative social systems and ways of being in the world—ways that are 
grounded in women-centered principles and values.” 33 They also recognized that 
feminism could mean eliminating discrimination and oppression for “people of color, 
people with disabilities, people of different ages and socioeconomic classes, and 
lesbians and gay men,” or even ecofeminism, which blends feminism with 
environmentalism.34   
Judith Butler reflected on this debate in Undoing Gender when she said, “no 
one stands within a definition of feminism that would remain uncontested,” in part 
because of the arrival of “postfeminism” in 1985. 35 “Postfeminism” first appeared in 
Toril Moi’s Sexual/Textual Politics and was really intended to refer to a method of 
feminist deconstruction, but quickly gained (an erroneous) definition as the “end of 
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feminism,” as though feminism had somehow lost its relevance.36 Moi may not have 
intended “postfeminism” to be utilized in this way, but it seemed to resonate with the 
larger culture. As Rhonda Hammer noted, “in light of a rapidly multiplying number 
of women writers who call themselves ‘feminist’ and then systematically present 
antifeminist arguments, the very word feminist is losing its meaning.”37 
It was not so much that feminism was losing its meaning, but had more to do 
with the vastly different ideologies that were co-opting feminism, to the dismay of 
some. For instance, bell hooks noted that “lifestyle feminism ushered in the option 
that there could be as many versions of feminism as there were women.”38  As hooks 
understood, this was a move that took the political activism out of feminism, and so 
“no matter what a women’s politics, be she conservative or liberal, she too could fit 
feminism into her existing lifestyle.”39  hooks also cited Carmen Vazquez, who wrote 
in 1983, “we can’t even agree on what  a ‘Feminist’ is, never mind what she would 
believe in and how she defines the principles that constitute honor among us…so long 
as it gets you what you want, feminism in America has come to mean anything you 
like, honey.”40 Compare this criticism to Rebecca Walker, who perceived this free-
for-all feminism as a boon when she stated in 1995, “there was no one correct way to 
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be a feminist, no seamless narrative to assume and fit into.”41 For this time, it seems 
as though it was easy to be a feminist when it could be modified to describe nearly 
any given lifestyle.  
While feminism could be made to suit, identifying as a feminist seemed to 
lose its appeal during this time. “To make a fuss about sexual injustice is more than 
unfeminine,” observed Susan Faludi, “[feminism] is now uncool,” because “it lacks 
‘style.’”42 This is not, she asserted, because women believed that social justice had 
been achieved, but because “they themselves are beyond even pretending to care.”43  
This blasé attitude, she believed, may “deal the most devastating blow to American 
women’s rights.”44 This attitude was confirmed later in Naomi Wolf’s Beauty Myth, 
where she quoted a fashion magazine editor as saying, “Young women…‘absolutely 
don’t want to be known as feminists because ‘feminism is not considered sexy.’”45 
Scholarly research further confirms this observation, as several studies have 
examined the decreasing support and identification with feminism at this time.46 
The increasing unwillingness to identify as feminist led to a perception that 
the feminist movement had lost momentum. Division and faction had always been 
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part of the feminist movement and was nothing new in the late 80s.47 But the 
multiplicity of definitions and lack of solidarity at this time was new and disturbing. 
Simply, as hooks stated, “this way of thinking has made feminism more acceptable 
because its underlying assumption is that women can be feminists without 
fundamentally challenging and changing themselves or the culture,” and without 
impetus for radical change, “feminist politics is losing momentum because feminist 
movement has lost clear definitions.”48  
 The feminism of the 80s and 90s is almost always discussed as ill-defined, 
increasingly something with which people did not identify, and a movement that was 
flagging considerably. But its allegedly slump-like state did not mean that there was a 
lack of discourse about feminism. In fact, the third wave ushered in a series of highly 
publicized, hotly-debated feminist (and sometimes antifeminist) tomes. It was this 
media-fueled, polarizing rhetoric that Shalit was both a part of and challenging when 
A Return to Modesty was released in 1999. In what follows, I examine some of the 
more prominent voices of this discussion, particularly the ones Shalit mentions in A 
Return to Modesty.  
Popular Voices in the Third Wave—Redefining the Undefinable 
Shalit’s work did not exist in a vacuum. From the late 80s onward, the 
feminist conversation was fraught with disagreement. With a fractious ideology, 
under constant deconstruction, uniting people under a monolithic definition of 
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feminism was impossible. However, the fractured nature of feminism did not prevent 
feminism from being a popular topic.  
Shalit’s book came at the end of a decade’s worth of provocative works on 
feminism. There were many popular press books discussing feminism during the 90s, 
but as hooks noted, it did not necessarily constitute a healthy discourse. If anything, 
she believed the attention and heated debate generated at this time were mostly “a 
marketing ploy to advance the opportunistic concerns of individual women while 
simultaneously acting as an agent of antifeminist backlash by undermining 
feminism’s radical/revolutionary gains.” 49 Rhonda Hammer quoted hooks when she 
claimed, “Wendy Shalit garnered enormous publicity and media attention for her 
1999 antifeminist treatise A Return to Modesty: Discovering the Lost Virtue through 
what could be described as a cunning orchestration and transmutation of the ‘catfight’ 
scenario into a self-serving art form.”50 hooks noted that the popular “feminist” 
writers of the time were “all white,” mostly “from privileged class backgrounds,” 
“educated at elite institutions,” and conservative, a criticism applicable to Shalit.51 
Given the narrow standpoint, hooks questioned the function of the feminism popular 
at this time, as it de facto marginalized the concerns of “working-class white women, 
poor white women, and all women of color,”52 therefore divorced from “active 
struggle and engagement” necessary for bettering the lives of women.53 She argued, 
“as with any other ‘hot’ marketable topic, feminism has become an issue that can be 
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pimped opportunistically by feminists and anti-feminists alike.”54 Therefore, since 
“patriarchal-dominated mass media is far more interested in promoting the views of 
women who want both to claim feminism and repudiate it at the same time,” the likes 
of “Camille Paglia, Katie Roiphe, and…Naomi Wolf” succeeded in generating much 
talk of feminism, but avoided exercising any active feminist practice.”55  
Shalit engaged these very authors within her own work. There are a number of 
issues discussed throughout these books, each author with her own particular 
definition of feminism, but I believe the two issues that are most critical for 
understanding the context of Shalit’s work are discussions of “backlash” and the 
sexual ethics of the time. First of all, the notion of “backlash” seems to frame much of 
the discussion of feminism at this time. That is, many perceived that there was a 
regression in the feminist movement, either by losing potency or with flagrant 
attempts to “turn back the clock” on the women’s movement. This perception often 
prompted these writers to “revamp” feminism by offering a new definition, a new 
take, which would re-energize the movement. Second, popular press feminist books 
were concerned with making sense of the sexual revolution, either in that the authors 
perceived it had not gone far enough, or as others suggested, had perhaps gone too 
far. These arguments are important for understanding Shalit’s work, as these are the 
positions which she typically refutes, the definitional battlefield where she wages war 
in defense of modesty. 
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Susan Faludi’s book, Backlash, could be considered the first in the kind of 
popular feminism books that would span the 90s. Like others to follow, she claimed 
that feminism was in jeopardy, regressing to anti-feminist or misogynistic forces. 
Over five hundred pages in length, she argued that a very un-radical force was taking 
shape within popular culture, from newspaper articles to movies, an overarching 
“backlash” to feminism. She argued this backlash happened in two ways: first, that 
feminism had succeeded and equality had been won, and second, all that equality was 
making women very unhappy. For instance, she said, “Women have ‘made 
it,’…Women are so equal now, lawmakers say, that we no longer need an Equal 
Rights Amendment.”56 Conversely, the gains women had won were, in fact, sour 
grapes: for instance, the “Professional women are suffering ‘burnout’ and 
succumbing to an ‘infertility epidemic,’” while “single women are grieving from a 
‘man shortage.’”57 This, Faludi argued, was the hallmark of a backlash, that “women 
are unhappy precisely because they are free,” “enslaved by their own liberation.”58 
Such messages marked a large-scale “attempt to retract the handful of small and hard-
won victories that the feminist movement did manage to win for women.59 
 Backlash rhetoric essentially worked by “poisoning the well.” Whenever there 
is a “perception—accurate or not—that women are making great strides,” backlash 
arises from “men grappling with real threat to their economic and social well-
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being.”60 So, in order to combat the “perception” of women’s advancement, those 
working within popular media sought to point out the shortcomings of feminism and 
forsake it in favor of more traditional roles. In a statement that seems to warn of 
Shalit’s work about ten years later, Faludi warned that backlash rhetoric demands 
“that women ‘return to femininity,’” wherein society returns “to a fabled time when 
everyone was richer, younger, more powerful.”61 Naomi Wolf picked up the same 
theme a few years later, when she claimed that the “beauty myth” was the backlash to 
feminism, that is, a backlash “that uses images of female beauty as a political weapon 
against women’s advancement.”62 This “beauty myth” continued to hinder feminism; 
as she noted, “women breached the power structure,” but “eating disorders rose 
exponentially and cosmetic surgery became the fastest-growing medical specialty.”63 
In effect, the individualistic ideology of feminism from this time could not match the 
antifeminist “beauty myth” that stalled further progress.64  
 However, the backlash theory was not without criticism. A conservative critic, 
Christina Hoff-Sommers lumped Backlash and Beauty Myth together as “two 
impassioned feminist screeds” that offered “conspiracy theories” as an explanation to 
the contemporary woman’s problems.65 She claimed that the primary aim of these 
“popular books” was to spread a message “of humiliation, subordination and male 
backlash [to] bolster the doctrine of a bifurcated society in which women are trapped 
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in the sex/gender system.”66 The problem with this argument was, Sommers 
contended, that “no reasonable person in this day and age could be expected to 
believe that somewhere in America a group of male ‘elders’ has sat down to plot 
ways to perpetuate the subjugation of women.”67 Furthermore, Sommers argued that 
Faludi and Wolf perpetrate a belief not only in a group of sinister males “plotting and 
planning their next backlash maneuvers,” but “it is women themselves who 
‘internalize’ the aims of the backlash, who, unwittingly, do its bidding.”68 
 Whether or not “backlash” to feminism was being carefully engineered or not, 
this was part of the perception that feminism was fragmenting and had somehow 
failed to do what was promised. Shalit responded to this sentiment within her two 
books, but the dominant and driving force of her work was her solution to a culture in 
the aftermath of a sexual revolution. Shalit set her argument in contrast to two 
ideological camps: those who believed that the sexual revolution did not go far 
enough in liberating women from constraining stereotypes, and those who believed 
that it went too far and consequently created a culture threatening to women. As 
stated earlier, Shalit’s work engaged a number of popular authors, those being 
Camille Paglia, Naomi Wolf, and Katie Roiphe, each of whom offered her own form 
of feminism to counteract “backlash” forces. 
Camille Paglia was a particular target within Shalit’s argument, for obvious 
reasons. In several highly-publicized books, Paglia contended that the feminist 
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movement had made a wrong move in trying to neutralize the power inherent within 
sexual relationships; as she said, “sexual equality before the law—the first great goal 
of modern feminism—cannot so easily be transferred to our emotional lives, where 
woman rules.”69 She contended that the “special protections” for women under the 
law were “infantilizing and anti-democratic,” as well as the “overregulation of 
sexuality,” an obvious reference to anti-pornography and sexual harassment laws and 
debates popular at this time.70 “Feminists,” as Paglia’s argument went, “grossly 
oversimplify the problem of sex when they reduce it to a matter of social convention: 
readjust society, eliminate sexual inequality, purify sex roles, and happiness and 
harmony will reign.”71 This is ultimately a battle that cannot be won, as they “have 
set themselves against nature. Sex is power. Identity is power.”72 So while feminists 
desired to neutralize power relations between the sexes within the court system, the 
work place, and in the bedroom, Paglia pointed out that the hierarchical natures of 
men and women cannot be regulated.73 
 Drawing upon Western art and pornography, which “show us the real truth 
about sex,” Paglia sought to define feminism as that which celebrates the femme 
fatale, a woman who acknowledged, and to an extent, exploited the sexual differences 
between men and women.74 She called for a “revamped feminism,” wherein “the lady 
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must be a tramp.”75 By this she meant that the “‘nice’ girl, with her soft, sanitized 
speech and decorous manners, had to go.”76 Instead, a new kind of woman was 
needed to revive feminism, that of the powerful, sexual woman. Paglia argued to 
“reclaim the Whore of Babylon,”77 and bring back the “vamps and tramps,” the 
“tough-cookie” feminist to counter “the smug self-satisfaction and crass materialism 
of yuppie feminism.”78 In Paglia’s view, feminism is a celebration of the sexual 
power of women, a power which comes from rejecting the “nice” and taking on the 
archetype of femme fatale as a way of changing relations between the sexes. 
While Paglia might have labeled Naomi Wolf a proponent of “yuppie 
feminism,” Wolf carried a similar message of rejecting prescribed stereotypes and 
urging sexual freedom. Within her two books, The Beauty Myth and Promiscuities, 
Wolf echoed Paglia’s message that feminism needed a definitional facelift. Where 
Paglia aimed to do this in a more public, political way, Wolf wanted to change 
feminism by altering the way women privately perceived their bodies and sexuality. 
Wolf said, “women my age and younger have inherited a sexual script, derived from 
both the feminist and the sexual revolutions, that is by now out-of-date.”79 While the 
sexual revolution provided greater access to family planning and education, “we still 
did not inherit a culture that valued and respected female desire.”80 Wolf sought to 
offer a solution in her books by both exposing the ways in which female sexuality is 
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appropriated and what women can do in order to reclaim their sexuality. Above all, 
Wolf promoted tolerance and an individualistic approach: “a woman wins when she 
feels that what each woman does with her own body—unforced, uncoerced—is her 
own business.”81 In reclaiming her sexuality, a woman must be unapologetic in her 
pursuit of pleasure: 
 Let’s be shameless. Be greedy…Wear and touch and eat and drink 
what we feel like. Tolerate other women’s choices. Seek out the sex 
we want and fight fiercely against the sex we do not want.82 
By doing so, Wolf, like Paglia, believed this would upset the dominant stereotypes 
and conceptions of femininity.  
 In contrast to the views of Paglia and Wolf was an ideology that found the 
sexual revolution much more problematic, as found in books by Katie Roiphe. 
Roiphe, in direct opposition to the laissez-faire views of sexuality, found such ethics 
to be lacking; as she said, “our ecstatic individualism…urges us: Please yourself. 
Express yourself. Fulfill yourself.”83 However, Roiphe recognized that these 
structures, while imposed and moralistic, provided a meaning and definition to sex. 
As she pointedly realized after a one-night stand, “it came to me, with a surprising 
rush of disappointment, that no one cared,” concluding that “the ease with which we 
can now slip in and out of intimacy, the sheer convenience of it, is not as desirable it 
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might once have seemed.”84 Roiphe’s books centered around what Wolf would call 
“the harder-to-talk-about experiences of the ambivalent slut.”85 For instance, while 
not opposed to the sexual revolution, Roiphe uncovered the ambivalent tensions 
experienced by those who were “sexually liberated” without providing any real 
solutions. She recognized the sorry state of casual sex and keenly desired social 
limitations,86 but also described her disgust at the born-again virgin working as 
secretary for Beverly LaHaye and the Concerned Women for America.87 While she 
never offered a solution to these problems, Roiphe’s work serves as the question that 
Shalit attempts to answer in her defense of modesty. 
 As bell hooks may have rightly assessed, many of these writers gained 
massive notoriety through their incendiary claims and definitions of individualistic 
feminism. Their attempts to offer a solution, or at least get to the root of the problems 
facing American women, dominated popular feminism. While vastly differing in their 
ideas, they all contained a common thread: re-defining feminism and sense-making in 
the aftermath of the sexual revolution.  
Conclusion 
Two years before A Return to Modesty, Roiphe noted the irony of sexual 
culture: “Being free from the rigid values of social convention no longer means going 
home with a man you meet in a bar or hiding birth control pills in the cotton depths of 
your underwear drawer. In resisting the pressure to be carefree and defying the 
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seductive authority of their peers,” it is the virgin that has become the true rebel.88 It 
was this topsy-turvy world, the rebellious virgin, that Shalit would seize upon and 
gain immense publicity. Like her counterparts within third-wave popular feminist 
discourse, Shalit had to navigate difficult terrain when she began writing A Return to 
Modesty and Girls Gone Mild, full of shifting and expanding definitions of an eroding 
movement, and with any brand of feminism on shaky ground, staking out a position 
based on essential nature of men and women as Shalit did within A Return to Modesty 
was a bold move, a strategy which would have considerable bearing on her later 
writing. 
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Chapter 3 
 
“A Return” to Limitations: Arguing for Real Definitions 
 
 
In the introduction of A Return to Modesty, Shalit offers several personal 
anecdotes which all indicate that these are troubling times for women. In one story, 
she recounts listening to friend of hers tell of an affair she had with a professor. Shalit 
is puzzled by her friend’s fumbled attempts to verbalize her feelings, struck “that she 
felt she had to apologize for the fact that [the affair] had deeply upset her.”1 In 
listening to her friend, she states, “it occurred to me that in an age where our virginity 
is supposed to mean nothing, and where male honor is also supposed to mean 
nothing, we literally cannot explain what has happened to us.”2 From this she 
concludes, “we can no longer talk in terms of someone, say, defiling a virgin, so 
instead we punish the virgin for having any feelings at all. Nevertheless, although our 
ideology can expunge words from our vocabulary, the feelings remain and still cry 
out for someone to make sense of them.”3 Her purpose in A Return to Modesty “is to 
restore this lost moral vocabulary of sex,” an argument which she consistently frames 
in terms of essentialized gender roles as enacted within older, simpler times and 
conservative religious traditions.4 The problems that plague “the modern young 
woman,” she contends, indicate a loss of “respect for female modesty.”5 While she 
acknowledges that there are many women who exercise modesty in their private lives, 
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“no woman has ever attempted a systematic defense of modesty.”6 Up to this point, 
Shalit posits that “many of the men who have written about sexual modesty have 
either attacked or defended it for reasons that strike [her] as false.”7 Her writing 
proposes to be a middle ground, one which takes into account “the claims of the 
feminists” that violence, rape, anorexia, and objectification are very real problems.8 
However, she also invites feminists “to consider whether the cause of all this 
unhappiness might be something other than the patriarchy,” as she claims that 
misogyny can very well flourish without the benefit of patriarchy.9 Furthermore, her 
“purpose is not to suggest to provocatively dressed women that they need to cover 
up,” which “would be absurd.”10 Instead, “this book is for the woman who is forever 
asking herself in public ‘Do I look OK?’ Who cannot think or talk of anything other 
than ‘Do I look OK?’”11 By writing, Shalit desires to restore modesty as a cultural 
value and practice for the benefit of those who are unhappy and uncomfortable with 
contemporary sexual ethics. 
Shalit’s strategy in this book entails arguing for a real definition of modesty 
by dissociation, which consist of several moves. First, she vilifies feminist ideology 
as harmful to women. Second, she argues that popular definitions of sexism and 
modesty are misleading. Third, she offers a real definition of sexism and modesty, an 
understanding which is more empowering to women than feminist ideology. While 
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this strategy of dissociation resonated with some, it is evident that it also created 
considerable rhetorical limitations, ones that Shalit would later have to overcome in 
her second book, Girls Gone Mild.  
Dissociating Feminism from Liberation 
Throughout A Return to Modesty, Shalit chronicles the problems facing the 
modern woman. These problems range from very serious issues such as rape12 and 
eating disorders,13 to the complaints found in popular magazines, such as self-
consciousness14 and unhappy romantic relationships.15 In her argument, Shalit seeks 
to dissociate feminism from positive connotations. She argues that feminist thought is 
now infused within contemporary culture, yet women are facing a whole new set of 
problems.16 In particular, she claims that the brand of “equal opportunity” feminism 
has worked against the interests of women. As Shalit describes it, feminist ideology 
that seeks to make the sexes “equal,” promote androgyny, and eliminate sexual 
difference between men and women is at the root of the troubling culture that men 
and women face. 
Most would not associate feminism with misogyny, yet in Shalit’s defense of 
modesty, she seeks to do precisely this. This misogynistic feminism is to be found in 
the views of both academic feminist writers and the popular authors mentioned in the 
previous chapter.17 Shalit claims that feminist writers, ranging from Mary 
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Wollstonecraft to Camille Paglia, are misogynistic, as far as they seek to deny or 
erase the essential feminine traits of women.18  If one searches “any page of The 
Second Sex or The Feminine Mystique,” he or she is “bound to find more misogyny 
than in the writings of Aristotle and Norman Mailer combined—sexist as they might 
have been, at least these men never called women ‘parasites,’” a reference to Simone 
de Beauvoir’s work.19 Similarly, Shalit repudiates Andrea Dworkin’s claim that 
“‘man’ and ‘woman’ are fictions, caricatures, cultural constructs.”20 Shalit believes 
the critical trap of contemporary society is that it posits a liberated woman must reject 
the femininity that has restricted her in the past, as behaving in a masculine fashion is 
the only way to establish equality.21 Feminism, claims Shalit, holds that strict gender 
constructions are no longer the rule.22 For example, she cites Judith Butler, who 
“criticizes ‘feminists’ for even claiming to support the ‘fictive’ category called 
‘women.’”23 Popular ideology contends that gender should be fluid and free, yet 
women are not as free as one would think. Shalit claims, “you can be a bitch, you can 
be a slut, you can sleep around as much as you want, and you can pretend to be a 
man, but you’re not allowed to be this,” meaning a feminine, modest woman.24  Many 
women of Shalit’s generation grew up hearing, “‘Just because you’re a woman,’” 
meaning that biological sex should not restrict a woman from becoming what she 
wants to be, but as Shalit queries, “what is meaningful about being a woman?  Rosie 
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the Riveter was riveting only because she didn’t usually rivet, and now that so many 
Rosies do, we most long to know what makes us unique again.”25   
In Shalit’s view, the ideology of anti-essentialism plays out to a large extent in 
the writings of Camille Paglia, Naomi Wolf, and Katie Roiphe, the popular authors 
against whom Shalit positions herself. For instance, Shalit comments on the common 
thread of androgyny present in these works. Paglia encourages women to be tough 
and “take your blows like men.”26 The femme fatale that Paglia promotes in Vamps 
and Tramps is a gritty, strong woman, the antidote to the repressed, boring 
housewife.27 Yet, despite the fact that “a fatal woman is the thing to be,” Shalit argues 
that becoming an “‘active’ female sexual predator…typically trivializes some other 
woman’s suffering,” again, indicating that this is an inherently misogynistic 
ideology.28 
Similarly, Naomi Wolf urges women to give up pretenses at goodness and 
“‘explore the shadow slut who walks alongside us.’”29 Shalit counters this by arguing 
that “it is the very codes of conduct which the ‘antiessentialists’ attack —the ones that 
modesty inspires—that are in fact a woman’s protection against rape.”30 She is 
adamant that women were damaged by the sexual revolution, which some feminists 
have even recognized as true.31 The deconstruction of gender roles in society was 
                                                 
25
 Ibid., 137. Italics in original. 
26
 Ibid., 138. 
27
 Ibid., 167. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Ibid., 8. 
30
 Ibid., 112. 
31
 Ibid., 192. “Indeed, the feminist Sally Cline now refers to the sexual revolution, in retrospect, as the 
‘Genital Appropriation Era.’” 
44 
 
supposed to be liberating, yet many women struggle to reconcile internal feelings 
with societal expectations.32  Shalit points out the confusion and disappointment that 
supposedly results from third-wave feminist ideology and offers the example of Katie 
Roiphe, who is “upset that the doorman didn’t flinch when she left someone’s 
apartment in the morning,” and so “the sad, incredulous question is the same: Don’t 
you guys care about us at all? No, nobody seems to. Nobody says a word.”33 These 
ambiguous and troubling feelings indicate to Shalit that the androgynous ideology 
promoted by feminism is ultimately disappointing if not dangerous, never really 
delivering on promised liberation and never really responsive to the biological and 
essential qualities of women.  
Shalit also offers examples from popular magazines that indicate the failure of 
feminist ideology. Even when trying to behave in a masculine fashion, women cannot 
stop the naturally feminine tendencies from surfacing: “The myth of sameness, 
instead of helping to cure the insecurity, seems to fuel it,” Shalit remarks about 
Cosmo, which encourages women to engage in promiscuity but still contains stories 
of women who remain desperately needy in their romantic relationships.34 Shalit is 
skeptical of claims that women can enjoy casual sex as much as men, and she cites 
several popular magazine articles that appear to bolster her claim. One article, called 
“Women Who Have Sex with Lots of Men,” proudly featured women who appear to 
need no romance in their sex lives, to which Shalit dryly adds, “how convenient for 
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them that they are made this way.”35  Especially since most of the women within the 
article seemed to hold regrets about their promiscuous past, Shalit presents this as 
further evidence that women cannot be as masculine as they want. Shalit would 
contend that this dismay and confusion over contemporary sexual ethics are the 
results of an ideology that is contradictory to human nature; as she states in the 
introduction of A Return to Modesty, “although our ideology can expunge words from 
our vocabulary, the feelings remain and still cry out for someone to make sense of 
them.”36 In all of these examples, Shalit is attempting to prove that what is commonly 
understood as liberation—feminism, sexual revolution, and androgyny—does not 
seem to be so. Yet, Shalit cannot simply let that stand. If she had denounced feminism 
as un-liberating, she must provide a way to repair reality, which is accomplished by 
offering liberation as the true definition of sexism and modesty. 
Dissociating Sexism and Modesty from Repression 
Feminism, in Shalit’s view, is a dead end, a solution that is unresponsive to 
the essential character of women.37 If women want to escape misogyny, dreary hook-
ups, and eating disorders, they will not find a solution within feminism. Instead, 
Shalit advocates for sexism through a “return to modesty.” She claims, “Modesty is 
our way out. For women who are tired of being told they must be either men or 
victims, modesty offers a new choice.”38 This ideology of modesty is rooted in 
sexism, that is, recognition of fundamental differences between men and women: 
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“The need is not for nonsexist upbringing, but for precisely a good dose of sexist 
upbringing: how to relate as a man to a woman.”39  
In order to argue for a real definition of sexism, Shalit had to first dissociate 
negative connotations from sexism. To do this, she brings to light the negative 
attitudes, but then points out the flawed understanding that these attitudes lead to. For 
example, she notes “today it is even thought to be sexist for a father to give away his 
daughter on her wedding day. That, we are told, is a concession to the view that 
‘women are property.’”40 Shalit then contrasts these attitudes with the observations of 
psychologist Mary Pipher, who finds that the “only clients who have escaped the 
standard litany of self-mutilation and eating disorders are the girls who are not 
sexually active—usually the ones who come from strict families with ‘paternalistic’ 
fathers.”41 Pipher wonders: “‘Why would a girl raised in such an authoritarian, even 
sexist, family be so well liked, outgoing and self-confident?’” from which Shalit 
deduces, “maybe it’s not so terrible, after all, to have someone feel he has a stake in 
your upbringing. A young woman is lucky, I think, if she has a ‘paternalistic’ 
father.”42 Despite the common understanding that sexism is bad, Shalit is attempting 
to offer counter-examples that redefine sexism as something that is beneficial to 
women. 
She continues to dissociate negative attitudes about sexism through other 
examples, such as an excerpt of a 1890s girl’s diary, wherein this young woman 
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wrote that she is resolved “to think before speaking,” and “be self-restrained in 
conversations and actions.”43 These aspirations could easily be called sexist, and have 
been, as she cites John Stoltenberg’s argument: “Her charity, her mercy, her grace 
(not for nothing have men personified all those abstractions as female in legend and 
art!) are in fact the emblems of female subordination to rapist ethics.”44 While Shalit 
makes a rather sweeping claim that this is now “accepted dogma,” she then asks, “but 
if charity, mercy, and grace are all deleted, what remains of womanhood?”45 Only 
vulgarity, apparently: “We said that it was sexist to suggest womanhood meant 
something more than just breasts and lipstick, and now we are left wondering why we 
are stuck with just breasts and lipstick.”46  
In Shalit’s view, real womanhood includes the eternal quality of modesty. 
“We have lost sight of what is truly beautiful in women,” and mostly because female 
modesty is roundly denounced as sexist and repressive to women.47 As she points out, 
contemporary images of womanhood have focused on the temporal. While it is sexist 
and archaic to speak of eternal qualities of womanhood, Shalit counters this by 
attacking current manifestations of womanhood, “breasts and lipstick,” as the real 
danger to women, the truly repressive ideology. She argues this point most clearly in 
a passage attacking the sexual revolution: 
The sexual revolution seems to have failed mostly because it ignored 
the differences between the sexes—specifically, the importance of 
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female modesty. When it failed, when women began to discover that 
they were uniquely compromised by a sexual free-for-all, there was an 
attempt to restore order. Women’s liberation may have been a valiant 
attempt to restore that order, but it, too, failed because it was reluctant 
to consider the importance of natural modesty, and held that all 
differences we observed were the result of oppression.48 
Sexism, in Shalit’s view, is not repressive, but really a recognition of the essential 
differences between men and women; without the benefit of this understanding, 
women are left unprotected and oppressed by the very ideology that claims to liberate 
them. With these arguments, Shalit seeks to destabilize sexism as solely negative. By 
showing proof that sexism can be empowering as enacted through modest practices, 
she opens up rhetorical space for sexism as positive. 
Arguing for Real Definitions of Sexism and Modesty 
By arguing for real definitions, Shalit not only had to argue for what sexism is 
not, but also what sexism truly is. By redefining sexism as something positive, rather 
than oppressive to women, this permits Shalit to offer modesty as an alternative to 
harmful feminist ideology, an alternative “for women who are tired of being told they 
must be either men or victims.”49 If sexism is the theory, then modesty is the practice: 
that is, if one believes that men and women have essential differences, then modesty 
is an exercise of this belief.  
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Richard Weaver noted that a “true conservative is one who sees the universe 
as a paradigm of essences,” an observation that is clearly evident within Shalit’s 
argument.50 Consistent with a conservative worldview, Shalit argues for real 
definitions as she defines modesty in terms of abstract essences; specifically, modesty 
is the essence of womanhood. One of the first definitions of modesty that she offers is 
that modesty is that which “makes womanliness more a transcendent, implicit 
quality,”51 much like the German notion of the “‘eternal feminine’ [which] gives 
women the enduring power to spiritualize mankind.”52 Modesty is also natural, a trait 
which is instinctive, rather than acculturated, to women.53 Oddly enough, even 
Shalit’s arch enemy, Simone de Beauvoir, believed that modesty was natural, and 
Shalit quotes from her extensively in her attempt to define modesty as natural to 
women: “There will always be certain differences between man and woman; her 
eroticism, and therefore her sexual world, have a special form of their own…Her 
modesty is in part a superficial acquirement, but it also has deep roots.”54 As much as 
modesty is a natural quality of women, modesty is also both erotic and innocent.55 As 
Shalit explains, “modesty damps down crudeness, it doesn’t dampen down Eros. In 
fact, it is more likely to enkindle it.”56 If “modesty is the proof that morality is 
sexy,”57 then it stands to reason that “sexual modesty is a virtue,” and as Shalit 
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predicts, it may also become “a virtue for an increasing numbers of us because it’s a 
way of affirming our essential innocence.”58 All of these definitions reflect Shalit’s 
belief that modesty is the essential quality of womanhood. She defines it in terms of a 
Platonic, idealized language, invoking “the eternal feminine,” instinct, and even 
describes it using the Greek word for erotic love, Eros. All of these arguments are an 
attempt by Shalit to move her audience’s understanding of modesty from what she 
believes is a misguided understanding to an understanding of what modesty truly is.  
Even though she argues modesty is an abstract essence of woman, Shalit 
never advocates for a set of rules dictating dressing or decorum. While Shalit may not 
offer a clear guide, she relies heavily upon conservative religious and historical 
examples to further her argument that modesty is truly liberating for women. In order 
to dissociate sexism from negative attitudes, Shalit takes religious practices which 
may be recognized as sexist and repositions them as practices that recognize and 
protect the essential natures of women and men, therefore offering sexism as 
something that can be positive, even liberating. For example, she offers the words of 
a Jewish woman who states, “I’ve heard people say that the no-sex-while-the-wife-is-
menstruating rule is sexist, because it comes from thinking women are unclean,” but 
the separation that this practice creates results in “the mystery and newness of a love 
affair” between her and her husband, something that helps to keep their marriage 
healthy.59 She also offers several examples and testimony from Islamic women, like 
one “20-year-old Muslim woman who does not consider herself to be oppressed or 
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repressed in the least,” and argues that Islamic dress prescriptions for men and 
women are meant to “prevent our natural feelings for the opposite sex from 
overpowering our logic and dictating our behavior,” a liberating practice.60 Shalit also 
offers another example, from the Atlanta Journal and Constitution, which reported 
that fundamentalist Islamic women regard veiling as “‘liberating modesty,’” and that 
“the black veil is the Islamic equivalent of an American business women’s pinstriped, 
bowtied business suit.”61 In all these examples, ostensibly viewed as sexist, Shalit 
refutes that women who engage in these practices are far more liberated than their 
liberal counterparts. Thus, through these examples, sexism should not be rooted in the 
negative connotations that it typically has.  
 After offering a definition of what sexism and modesty truly are, Shalit 
contends that adhering to sexist beliefs is more liberating for women than 
contemporary feminist ideology; after all, Shalit’s foremost argument is “modesty is 
powerful,”62 the solution to the frustration and anxiety felt by many women.63 To 
prove this, she seeks to redefine modesty as a powerful force, which she does by 
dissociating modesty from meekness and redefining it as a force that protects women 
from men and also has the potential to change society.  
Shalit is clear that women have very little defense against cultural pressures to 
be sexual at a very young age. Dr. Mary Pipher confirms this view, as “girls are 
pressured to be sexual regardless of the quality of relationships…they are worried that 
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they will be judged harshly for their bodies and lack of experience.”64 Shalit also 
points out that the expectations to be hyper-sexualized are carried on in the 
prescriptive relationship advice offered by books like Vamps and Tramps65 and 
popular magazines which advise women to be promiscuous.66  Offering modesty as 
an alternative lifestyle for her audience, Shalit empowers women to define their self 
worth in terms of dignity and integrity,67 in contrast to popular culture, which remains 
fixated on women as sex objects.68  
Modesty is responsive to the internal nature of women, versus contemporary 
culture which seeks to appropriate women’s bodies for men’s desires. Shalit believes 
that a common misconception about modesty is a denial of the sexual. She alludes to 
the erroneous dictionary definition, “modesty is ‘damping down of one’s allure,’” yet, 
Shalit believe this definition of sexual modesty is “seriously misunderstood” 69:  
If you think that women are basically stupid creatures, then you can 
easily accept this definition because it means that for thousands of 
years women were behaving and dressing ways that made them 
unappealing…But if you think that women are smart, then you know 
that there has to be more to the story of modesty than this. If you give 
women credit for being intelligent creatures, you trust them and 
assume that they wouldn’t have put up with dressing and acting in a 
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certain way for so many thousands of years unless it had some 
meaning for them.70 
Rather than modesty as a repressive force, Shalit redefines modesty as an active 
force, more concerned with deferring sexual pleasure until a more opportune moment 
rather than repressing it.71 Modesty is not a meek sense of shame concerning sex or 
the body, but a persuasive tool.72 This argument functions to address two barriers: 
first, that modesty denies sexuality, and secondly, that modesty is meekness. First of 
all, modesty, with its antiquated suggestion of repression, is really not prudish at all. 
As Shalit explains, modesty acknowledges the sensual nature of women, and in doing 
so, negotiates barriers her audience may have about the sexist (in the negative sense) 
implications modesty bears. Furthermore, Shalit makes modesty attractive by 
constructing it as a persuasive and protective force. It is not meek, but a powerful 
assertion of a woman’s worth: a modest woman is “not available for public use.”73  
Because modesty allows a woman to be assured of her worth as a woman, modesty’s 
power extends beyond just self esteem.  
Modesty recognizes not only self worth, but modesty also protects a woman 
against rape and harmful relationships. In the face of sexual harassment lawsuits, 
rape, serial hook-ups, and the hypersexualized depiction of women in the media, 
Shalit asks, “how can we expect men to be honorable when a large number of women 
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consistently send them the message that they do not have to be?”74 Clearly, it is up to 
women: they can do something about the way they are viewed by contemporary 
culture. If women want chivalrous behavior from men, women must be the 
instigators, not through aggressive demands, but by decent, modest behavior which 
inspires male honor.75 If women want safety and security in their workplaces, social 
gatherings, and in the street, feminine modesty and the subsequent masculine respect 
for it is her protection against rape and harassment.76 
While protection from rape is a major argument as to why modesty is 
powerful, Shalit also argues that women must adopt modesty in acknowledgement of 
the masculine predilection for promiscuity.77 She cites a 1994 study that found men 
would ideally like eight sexual partners over two years, but women desire only one 
sexual partner. Furthermore, the men claimed they would sleep with a woman after 
only a week’s acquaintance, as opposed to women, who said they would need a 
minimum of several months before sleeping with a man.78 Shalit believes there is 
such a thing as male modesty, which “seems to involve moderating one’s sexual 
activity and generally reserving it for one’s beloved.”79 While she is a bit vague as to 
what male modesty is, she is more confident in claiming that male honor must be 
inspired by feminine sexual modesty.80 Male honor exists in opposition to female 
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modesty, but cannot exist in opposition to something that is not there.81 Therefore, it 
is up to the woman: by guarding her sexuality through modesty, she will be rewarded 
with an honorable partner who will respond to her need for commitment, or until that 
time, she will be avoiding the heartache and trouble that comes from unfulfilling 
relationships.  
In Shalit’s view, agency unequivocally resides with women to be modest 
ladies in the first place, which will transform males into men. Shalit seeks to 
empower women to do something about the threats they face. If men will take what 
they can get, Shalit explains it is up to women to exact the treatment they feel they 
deserve. Therefore, if modesty has such power as not only to deflect the threat of 
rape, but turn men into the gentlemen that women crave, the solution Shalit offers 
overcomes a considerable cultural barrier her audience faces. Shalit points out how 
unhappy women are with the ethics of contemporary relationships, hook-ups and 
casual sex.82 By explaining how modesty functions in protecting women, Shalit 
creates an attractive solution: modesty is attainable for any woman, and modesty 
grants agency to a woman in protecting her body as well as her heart.  
Furthermore, the power of modesty can effect immense societal change, 
especially if women decide to band together in support of modesty. Shalit argues, “if 
we are ever going to reduce the survival value there is in immodesty, there must be 
not five or six women following this or that arbitrary rule, but a real cultural shift. We 
must decide as women to look upon sex out of wedlock as not such a cool thing, after 
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all, and recreate the cartel of virtue.”83 With this “cartel of virtue,” Shalit seeks to 
empower women within her audience as a whole. They, who are all too familiar with 
woman-hating, backstabbing games since youth, must come together and behave 
collectively instead of competing with one another. 84  Especially in a culture where 
nearly everything is permitted, the prescriptive nature of modesty must be protected 
by more than just a few individuals.85  Redefining modesty as not just an individual 
virtue, but something that demands to be protected by all women within a society will 
help to create a larger sense of community and increase the survival rate of modesty. 
Therefore, employing this “cartel of virtue” is empowering for Shalit’s audience, as 
they need not think that they are alone in their pursuit of modesty. Certainly, there is 
strength in numbers, and when modesty is assaulted from all sides, Shalit works to 
create a sense of support and solidarity in order to decrease the anxiety about being 
modest in an immodest world.86 In all of these arguments, Shalit is correcting what 
she believes to be an incorrect understanding of modesty. Rather than meekness, she 
contends that modesty is a powerful force, one that can correct the problems that 
feminism has yet to fix.  
Limitations of Arguing for Real Definitions 
Shalit sought to correct what she perceived as misunderstandings by offering 
definitions of sexism and modesty that she believed were reflective of their true 
essence. This did resonate with some reviewers. For example, George Will, who 
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wrote an enthusiastic review of A Return to Modesty in Newsweek, called the book an 
“insouciant manifesto for mature eroticism” which is “much more ambitious than the 
banal political agendas of contemporary feminism.”87  Elizabeth Powers, who 
reviewed the book in Commentary, stated that Shalit has “preternaturally sharp eyes 
and mind,” and “has seen deeply into female nature, and into the malaise of a 
generation.”88 However, arguing for real definitions bears some inherent limitations. 
One of the biggest limitations of arguing for real definitions is that “there is no way to 
escape the historical contingency of any particular definitional proposition,” meaning 
that “the belief that a particular definition captures the ‘real’ nature of any given X is 
inextricably linked to a number of related beliefs that are held in a particular historical 
context.”89 In other words, arguing for real definitions can potentially be perceived as 
circular argumentation, “cherry picking” certain traits without recognizing that they 
are interconnected to other circumstances. Much of the criticism of A Return to 
Modesty illustrates precisely this objection. Reviewers tended to focus on three 
particular issues where dissociation was not strong enough to change audience’s 
beliefs: Shalit’s conceptions of feminism, historical context, and illustrations of 
modesty. 
The first rhetorical limitation Shalit faced was her treatment of feminism. 
Perhaps the most embittered criticism of A Return to Modesty is found in the reviews 
that attack Shalit’s representation of feminism. Some reviewers perceived that Shalit 
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sided with feminists, stating as Mark Satin did, that although Shalit was deeply 
embedded in conservative journalism, “the book isn’t Conservative Diatribe #35 
against feminism.”90 In fact, he continues, A Return to Modesty acknowledges “that 
‘the feminists were right’—many young women really are suffering from anorexia or 
bulimia, and date rape is a lot more common than you think.”91 However, other 
reviewers did not perceive Shalit as sympathetic to feminists at all. As Sharon Krum 
wrote, Shalit “lines up Naomi Wolf, [Camille] Paglia, [Katie] Roiphe and [Gloria] 
Steinem among others like ducks in a shooting gallery, [and] takes aim at them all.”92 
These ideological attacks puzzled some reviewers, like Belinda Yandell, who did not 
“understand Shalit’s perception of feminism and equality. Where does she get the 
idea that equates equality with the right to be rude and crude?...I thought feminism 
meant, ‘don’t respect me because I am a woman but because I am a unique and 
valuable individual.’”93 Other reviewers perceived that she was diametrically opposed 
to feminism, stating that Shalit’s “antifeminist appeal to women to give up sex and 
work for the good of the culture is a cynical, inherently conservative effort to silence 
a real political question—what kind of society is best for human beings?—and 
replace it with a vision of domestic utopia.”94 Clearly, Shalit’s attempts to associate 
feminism with harmful ideology did not ring true for many reviewers. 
                                                 
90
 Mark Satin, "Modest Women, Honorable Men," The Radical Middle Newsletter  (1999), 
http://www.radicalmiddle.com/x_shalit.htm. 
91
 Ibid. 
92
 Sharon Krum, "Safe Our Sex," The Guardian (1999), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/1999/apr/01/gender.uk. 
93
 Amazon.com, "Belinda Yandell," Amazon.com  (2000), 
http://www.amazon.com/review/R382UDGKAIXA7O. 
94
 Phillips-Fein, "Feminine Mystiquers." 
59 
 
As stated earlier, one arguing for real definitions runs the risk of ignoring 
historical context. The conservative “return” to a golden past proves to be the second 
major limitation to this work. By advocating for female sexual modesty, Shalit claims 
that the problems women and men endure today will go away; after all, “none of 
[her]grandmother’s friends are anorexic”95 and dressing modestly will prevent 
harassment and induce respect (with three exceptions).96  However, this ideology of 
conservatism clearly did not resonate with all of Shalit’s audience. Reviewers of A 
Return to Modesty were particularly concerned with Shalit’s historical interpretations. 
“I suppose,” said “Homeschooling Single Mom,” “if you are a privileged, formally 
educated and sheltered white girl the way Shalit is, it might seem like ‘all women’ got 
treated as ‘ladies’ before the 1950s, but anyone who has made even a brief survey of 
women’s history can easily write that notion off as utterly laughable at best, and 
heinously insensitive at worst.”97 Another anonymous review stated that “the world 
can be a sad place for women who did not have the kind of privileged upbringing that 
Ms. Shalit crows about incessantly, as if her own luck was a mark of virtue.”98 As 
with other reviewers, Shalit’s perceived lack of battle wounds discredited her in the 
war for modesty, portraying her as cut-off from a larger cultural reality. 
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Reviewers also were bothered by her conceptualization of modesty. What 
Shalit offers as paragons of modesty wins her considerable disapproval, most 
reviewers questioning if modesty of ages past was as widespread as Shalit presumes 
or if it would be so suitable for today. Emily Eakin commented on Shalit’s call for 
recreating the “‘cartel of virtue,’” which must be made to “sound less like voluntary 
house arrest.”99 She continues by adding that “there is no evidence that women were 
happier about their sexual lives—or more free of rape—in the pre-sex-ed days of Jane 
Austen.”100 Katha Pollitt, in a New York Times book review, was especially critical of 
Shalit’s methods of proof for modesty. Shalit claimed that respect for modesty was 
once so high that, as Alexis de Tocqueville remarked, “American women could safely 
go anywhere alone.”101 Pollitt continues: 
Using the same cut-and-paste approach, one could just as easily prove 
that antebellum American men showed far less respect for women’s 
modesty than men today. After all, slave owners routinely and legally 
violated their slaves, brothels flourished and the age of consent in most 
states was 7. 102 
Pollitt speculates that perhaps there is a connection “between the veneration of some 
and the degradation of others. Shalit wants women to be madonnas—but can you 
have madonnas without whores?”103 Others also maligned Shalit’s fixation with the 
Victorian. As Phillips-Fein remarked, “[Shalit] thinks romantic love used to be 
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‘beautiful and true’ but has been corrupted by a selfish, competitive 
individualism.”104 Shalit’s is foolishly “fixat[ed] on Victorian-era marriage,” as she 
fails to recognize that even then, marriage was “far from being the epitome of 
romance, [and] was often just a business deal under another name.”105 
 Jonah Goldberg’s criticism echoed that of Pollitt and Phillips-Fein, as he 
stated, “[Shalit] may pine for an age of long skirts, quaint courtship rituals, modesty 
pieces, and Talmudic injunctions against touching, along with every other cultural 
barrier that ever has been erected between the sexes. But,” he argues, “she pays no 
homage to the historical contexts that created them.”106 While he does pick up on the 
different conditions that women faced like other reviewers, Goldberg contends that 
Shalit misreads the past as a prescription rather than a suggestion: “Ancient wisdom 
is a vital guide for reform, not a replacement for it…If modern society suddenly 
adopted calling cards and modesty pieces, it would not enjoy an instant moral 
restoration. It would be hobbled with kitsch.”107 Likewise, Barbara Defoe Whitehead 
observed that the customs past Shalit offered in her advocacy for modesty were tied 
to other cultural systems. For instance, the closely monitored courtship of earlier 
decades largely disappeared because “young adults are living away from home as 
singles,” never mind that many women now marry in their mid- to late-twenties.108 
The third rhetorical limitation of A Return to Modesty is Shalit’s ill-fitting 
examples of female modesty. While Shalit argued that veiling is not repressive, 
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headscarves are not exactly equated with anything resembling liberation to most in a 
Western secular audience. Some noted Shalit’s ambiguous definition of modesty 
could serve as an advantage, as Sarah Hinlicky observed, “Shalit never hones in on 
one strict definition of [modesty], but rather than being a flaw, this is the great 
strength of her argument, one that permits all kinds of women in all kinds of 
situations to appreciate the value of what she is saying.”109 While Shalit relies on a 
number of interpretations of modesty, particularly “the Jewish modesty laws,” the 
emphasis she places on modest appearance “is the logical corollary of an internalized 
ethic of sexual restraint. Hence the very sensible connection between sexual modesty 
as a social virtue and sexual morality is a religious one.”110 While this seems to 
contradict Schiappa’s assertion that arguing for real definitions is inherently limiting, 
it would indicate that this argument could very well work for an audience who 
already operates from a belief in objective reality, predisposed to the conservative 
views on gender that Shalit supports. 
However, for other reviewers, the abstract definition of modesty was not a 
winning feature of Shalit’s argument. Another anonymous reviewer from 
amazon.com wondered, “should women be wearing bathing suits or burqas?”111 By 
his or her reckoning, “the book did little to address these difficult cultural issues other 
than to leave one to wonder” what modesty looks like in a secular Western society.112 
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Other reviewers echoed this criticism, as one reviewer observed that “Shalit spends 
300 pages trying to convince us that men will stop being so disrespectful if we would 
only dress more modestly, and then regales us with a tale of a young man sending this 
newly modest girl harassing notes about what he’d like to do to her because her 
modesty is so sexy.”113 This disadvantage also turned into a slippery-slope for other 
reviewers. In a highly publicized Slate.com debate between Cathy Young and Shalit, 
Young pointed out that choice, beyond just virginity or promiscuity, should be 
available to women. But “you [Shalit] don't really trust young women with that 
choice; like children, they must be protected from themselves by external 
prohibitions. (It must warm your heart to read about Arab women whose male 
relatives kill them for sexual transgressions: Now, there's a way to reinforce a girl's 
resolve to say no!)”114 While Shalit responded that “this is exactly the kind of 
rhetorical overkill that you deplore when committed by feminists,” it was not an 
isolated criticism, either. Tara Zahra from The American Prospect sensed a 
disjuncture between Shalit’s call for a return to modesty and liberal democracy: 
Shalit says she would like to be “young ladied” more often. As in, 
“Young lady, what are you doing? Young lady, where are you going?” 
But—based on her own precocious career—she presumably doesn't 
want this to extend to “Young lady, you don't belong at this school,” or 
“Young lady, you will marry that man.” Shalit seems not to realize that 
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these strictures lie only slightly further down the continuum toward 
ceding all freedom of choice. Full membership in a liberal democratic 
society means women need to take on …not just choice, but the 
responsibility that comes with choice.115 
These arguments suggest that Shalit’s conception of modesty may conflict with a 
women’s role in a liberal democracy. Some conceptions of modesty have no place in 
contemporary America, or simply cannot exist because limitations that once kept 
women confined to certain roles are now gone. This was evident in many reviews, as 
people questioned Shalit’s absolute position on modesty’s power, often pointing out 
that modesty is not always an unequivocal message of female empowerment, or that 
Shalit tends to ignore the male contribution to interaction between the sexes.  
Critics also pointed out that modesty does not always send a message of 
empowerment. Barbara Defoe Whitehead noted that Shalit seemed to present a black-
and-white notion of modesty, one that overlooked the multiplicity of ways that 
modest behavior may be read, for instance, “as passivity or stupidity. Girls with 
downcast eyes are sometimes overlooked or underestimated. And modesty can lead to 
misplaced shame and silence.”116 Echoing Goldberg’s criticism, Whitehead argued 
that “modesty is a frail defense against male sexual aggression and misconduct which 
is why it has always been surrounded by legal sanctions, social controls, and cultural 
codes, most of which have now been repealed.”117  Other reviewers noted a critical 
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weakness in Shalit’s defense of modesty. As “Sabrina’s Mom” noted, “her tactics 
sound like victim-blaming, and cannot be universally applied. In 2006, a 20-year-old 
Orthodox woman in Lakewood was abducted and raped. That same year, a predator 
was molesting young girls in the Orthodox Jewish neighborhood of Borough Park. In 
both cases, the victims were quite modest,” which may give a reader pause as to 
Shalit’s assertion that modesty grants unqualified power.118 For these reviewers, 
Shalit’s attempts to redefine modesty as powerful simply fell flat, unable to overcome 
the experiences of these people who knew all too well that modesty cannot always 
win. 
In many instances, the dissociation between modesty and repression was not 
strong enough to persuade the reviewers to adopt Shalit’s understanding. By ignoring 
historical context, “cherry picking” the elements that she felt reflected the true nature 
of modesty and sexism, Shalit’s argument failed to resonate, limiting her audience to 
those who were already sympathetic to her views. 
Conclusion 
Clearly, Shalit faced considerable limitations to her argument in A Return to 
Modesty. She sought to “restore the lost moral vocabulary of sex” through a 
conservative strategy of arguing for real definitions of sexism and modesty. In her 
attempts to vilify feminism, dissociate sexism and modesty from negative 
connotations, and redefine them as protective and powerful, her readers perceived 
that Shalit wrongly maligned feminism, ignored historical context, and overestimated 
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the power that modesty has to offer. For all these limitations, though, Shalit’s work 
continued on in a very different way, as she co-opted a previously vilified term, 
feminism, for her own cause. While Shalit’s rhetoric in A Return to Modesty did pose 
considerable limitations, it was not so limiting that it would prevent her from 
redefining sexism as feminism, a move which proves extremely advantageous to her 
argument. 
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Chapter 4 
 
“Mild(er)” Criticism: Arguing for Founders’ Intent  
 
In the introduction to Girls Gone Mild, Shalit is worried, and it is not difficult 
to see why. Exactly what kind of society do we have, she wonders, when hyper-
sexualized Bratz Babyz dolls are marketed to toddlers, porn stars Ron Jeremy and 
Jenna Jameson have a pre-teen fan base, and Hello Kitty is emblazoned on thongs?1 
Her problem with these phenomena is not so much that it is “inappropriate” for a 
young girl to be wearing clothing more suited to someone who charges by the hour, 
but it is all indicative of a larger cultural trivialization of sex: “There is no longer any 
mystery or power to sex—it is just expected that everything will be sexual, and so 
nothing is.”2 Yet, despite the shock and despair, Shalit’s primary purpose for Girls 
Gone Mild is to highlight a new cultural shift, as evidenced by certain young women 
who seem to embody Shalit’s ideology of modesty. She says:  
We are living through a unique cultural moment, society moving on 
two tracks simultaneously…the STDs, the violent music, the 
oversexualized dolls all seem to be getting worse; and yet despite 
this—or perhaps because of it—a rebellion is already under way. 
Obviously, part of the reason I’ve written this book is that I was 
inspired by talking with these young women.3 
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These young women she features “chose to rebel…against cultural messages to be 
‘bad.’”4 The importance of their rebellion lies in Shalit’s belief that “we need new 
role models.”5 That is, if today’s young women are “to have meaningful choices and 
genuine hope, the ‘wild girl’ or ‘bad girl’ cannot seem like the only empowered 
option.”6 
 In doing so, Shalit also hopes to further what she believes is a rebellion 
already underway. After all, “the direction society takes depends on you, the reader: 
what we value and what we devalue.”7 Hopefully, a reader will adopt what Shalit 
claims is the heart of “fourth-wave feminism”: women should “be taken seriously for 
their brains and not their bodies.”8 At the very least, Shalit invites the reader to 
consider that “maybe the good girl isn’t so bad, after all,” by offering a positive 
portrait of what she believes is a new wave of feminism.9 If one does not actively take 
part in this new “fourth-wave feminism” Shalit hopes to “persuade just one person 
inclined to make fun of the ‘good girl’ to reconsider his or her scorn.”10 Her purpose 
is not all that different from A Return to Modesty: she maintains a conservative 
position as she seeks to reveal the major problems facing young women and the 
hazards of some feminist ideologies, while offering modesty as a better solution. 
However, her strategy for achieving this is remarkably different.  
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In a departure from A Return to Modesty, Shalit appropriated feminism and 
aligned it with modesty within Girls Gone Mild. This was no easy task, given her 
previous anti-feminist stance. In order to do so, she utilized an argument for founders’ 
intent. First, Shalit redefined modesty as “fourth-wave feminism.” This entails 
looking to the first wave of feminism as the authority and standard of what feminism 
should be. Shalit argues that the principles practiced by the first-wavers are a guide 
for these new fourth wave feminists. Second, just as fourth-wave feminism is 
feminism as it was intended to be, Shalit further argues for the primacy of this 
definition by dissociating second and third-wave feminisms from liberation. Finally, 
as Shalit designates a material source, first wave feminism, as the authority and 
standard for her advocacy of fourth-wave feminism, arguing for founders’ intent also 
entails abandonment of idealized language, which is evident in the absence of 
arguments for sexism and the essential nature of women, which had been previously 
featured in A Return to Modesty. 
Defining “Feminism’s (Mild) Fourth Wave” 
While Shalit’s purpose for Girls Gone Mild was essentially the same as A 
Return for Modesty, she argues for modesty in a very different way. The major 
difference between A Return to Modesty and Girls Gone Mild is her appropriation of 
a former enemy, feminism, into what she calls the fourth wave of feminism, which is 
equated with her ideology of modesty. In Shalit’s own words, she recognizes the 
power to be had within feminism, and that the time is right for redefinition. She 
observes: “though leaders of the feminist movement—and their opponents—might 
70 
 
 
like to portray it as a settled question, in fact the meaning of feminism is up for grabs 
right now. The ground is rumbling, and the ideological fault lines are shifting…”11 
Shalit’s further discussion of feminism indicates that she recognizes the “empty” 
nature of the word: 
I came to see that feminism had become a sort of Rorschach test: The 
word itself has become almost meaningless—and can refer to 
diametrically opposed ideas—and yet hearing what feminism means 
to others is still interesting and can tell you a lot. Some people use the 
term to signal that they care about the dignity of women. Others use it 
to indicate that they want to fight the very notion of being dignified at 
all. Usually to the youngest feminists, the idea of decency is 
tremendously appealing. Whereas to the older ones, it is the chief 
problem.12 
Clearly, Shalit recognizes the potential of feminism. “The word itself has become 
almost meaningless,” indicates a power vacuum and rather than blending in with 
other third-wave feminisms, she chose to call into being a new wave, one that draws 
upon original feminism. 
 Since Shalit has appropriated “fourth-wave feminism” as a stand-in for 
modesty, it is important to understand how she argues this position. First, Shalit 
distinguishes this fourth wave of feminism by implicitly designating the first wave as 
both the original authority and standard of liberation for women. Second, she argues 
                                                 
11
 Ibid., 206-07. 
12
 Ibid., 208-09. 
71 
 
 
that the “guiding spirit” of feminism was originally about liberation for women 
through moral principles and activism. Third, Shalit claims these new fourth-wavers 
are aligned with the spirit of first wave feminism, and are happier, more fulfilled, and 
empowered because of it. 
Chapter eight, entitled “Feminism’s (Mild) Fourth Wave,” is largely dedicated 
to recognizing what Shalit believes is a new (old) kind of feminism enacted by young 
women all over the country.13 These young feminists differ radically from their 
second and third wave predecessors, as they seem to enact Shalit’s argument for 
modesty:  
Their beliefs tend to distinguish them from the third-wave feminists 
who are usually quoted in the media. The fourth-wavers question 
pornography instead of wishing to star in it. They are more likely to be 
fans of Florence Nightingale than Nina Hartley. They are most taken 
with earlier feminists, the nineteenth-century women who were 
temperance advocates as much as suffragists. The suffragists argued 
that women should own property and have the right to vote precisely 
so that they might improve society with their moral perspective and 
their feminized heroism. The early feminists also believed in the 
sacredness of sexuality…so do these young women.14 
Based on this observation, Shalit concludes, “feminism is clearly very much alive for 
young women, but it is a feminism that makes the leadership uneasy. For it is not as 
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reflexively ‘bad-girl’ as it once was, and its focus on personal dignity and on sex 
being sacred will mean the biggest shakeup of feminism since Seneca Falls in 
1848.”15  
Rather than being another kind of feminism within the third wave, this new 
wave is drawing upon the original principles of feminism. Shalit points to the women, 
actions, and critical moments of the first wave: “Seneca Falls in 1848,” “Florence 
Nightingale,” “temperance advocates,” suffrage and property rights. Of course, the 
battles of the first wave are over: women have the right to vote, own property, and 
divorce. However, the “guiding spirit” of first wave feminism is still very relevant 
and sorely needed in today’s society. Shalit perceives that the first wave was rooted in 
moral principles, a critical point onto which she latches her conceptualization of 
modesty: “Some would say the original intention of the first wave of feminism was 
precisely this: for women to be taken seriously for their brains and not their bodies.”16 
Just as modesty values the internal qualities of women versus “breasts and lipstick,” 
these fourth-wavers seem to be doing precisely this in their protest against societal 
expectations that reduce women to their sexuality.  
 Building on this tension between older and younger generations, Shalit states, 
“feminist leadership tends to be vehemently opposed to the very moral message that 
the younger feminist espouse.”17 She offers the example of Katha Pollitt and her 
daughter Sophie Pollitt-Cohen to demonstrate this radical shift in feminist thinking. 
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Whereas Katha Pollitt vehemently attacked A Return to Modesty,18 Shalit points out 
that Pollitt’s daughter Sophie seemed to concur with Shalit about the disparity of the 
sexual revolution. Using excerpts from Sophie’s diary, published in 2006 as The 
Notebook Girls: Four Friends, One Diary, Sophie “realizes that the boys’ immaturity 
cannot be separated from the girls’ willingness to provide sexual favors to those 
boys.”19 Shalit points out that younger girls are not taken with the sexual 
exhibitionism promoted in the third wave and are questioning whether liberation is 
really the outcome of promiscuity. Like the first wave of feminism, they hold to the 
sacredness of sexuality and the importance of moral behavior. 
As she describes these young women, she says, “I came to think of these 
younger feminists as part of a fourth wave,” because they are so different from 
second and third wave feminists.20 The break between older and younger feminists is 
a reflection of a shift in values. She states: 
The battle for the soul of feminism goes on. As I traveled around the 
country, I found that when girls did identify as feminists, they did not 
identify with the official leadership. The younger feminists I 
encountered wanted a sharp departure from the “sex-positive” or pro-
porn feminism of years past. They wanted a movement that stressed 
dignity.21 
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This dignity which Shalit sees in the fourth wave is a reflection of what the first wave 
feminists enacted in their fight for suffrage, legal rights, and temperance. The first-
wavers fight to assert the equality of women has resurfaced in the fourth-wavers 
attempts to reclaim a dignified image of women in the media. 
 By pointing to the first wave of feminists as the guiding standard for 
feminism, Shalit signifies a shift, a new wave in feminism that revitalizes activism 
based on moral arguments. In contrast to the third-wavers’ attempt “to smooth over 
contradictions within feminism…the fourth wave is stressing activism again.”22 Shalit 
points out Léa Clermont-Dion, a young woman from Quebec, who “wants young 
women to rethink ‘what it is to be a liberated woman.’”23 Like the modest philosophy 
Shalit advocates, young women like Léa agree that the sexual revolution and its 
aftermath are not at all liberating. Léa stated, “‘We have to speak to young people 
about intimacy and love, not just performance,’” and this is not something that should 
be done by just anyone, but through “‘education campaigns [which] must be run by 
young people and not by ‘moralizing adults.’”24  
 “Moralizing adults” and “rebellious good girls” have clashed on other issues, 
as well. Shalit uses, among others, the examples of the Girlcott girls and Pure Fashion 
shows to further her case. All of these, she argues, show a younger generation of 
women who are questioning the attitudes of their elders and actively opposing them 
through morally-grounded arguments and activism. For example, the Girlcott girls 
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were a group of young women from Pennsylvania who, in late 2005, decided to 
“girlcott” a series of T-shirts sold by Abercrombie & Fitch featuring sayings such as, 
“Do I make you look fat?” and “Who needs brains when you have these?”25 In 
October of that year, they staged a protest against the retailer, which generated 
nationwide attention and quickly resulted in the shirts being pulled from inventory.26 
When a few of the Girlcotters went to meet with Abercrombie & Fitch executives, 
they were told that the shirts were meant for the “intelligent girl” who could sport a 
sense of irony and fun.27 However, these young women were not about to be told off. 
“Abercrombie had hoped to portray those who didn’t get the joke as unsophisticated, 
but this didn’t sit well with the girls, and especially not with Rebecca [Adelsheim]: 
‘It’s like if you’re sophisticated, you’ll be able to present yourself that way. But 
really, who is the joke on?  Ultimately the joke is on the girl.’”28 Clearly, these 
Girlcotters believed that the shirts did not respect or edify women in any way, and 
they managed to successfully challenge the retailer by voicing their opinion. 
  Shalit offers another example of good girls behaving badly, rejecting notions 
of what elder generations dictate in favor of a more dignified standard of behavior. 
Pure Fashion shows, teen fashion shows featuring modest clothing modeled by 
“happy, healthy-looking girls,” was started in 1999 by Challenge Club, a leadership 
organization for teenage girls.29 Shalit writes, “ironically, in 2001, at about the time 
the Pure Fashion Movement was getting off the ground, the political theorist Katha 
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Pollitt was predicting that nothing like it could ever happen: ‘…the realities of 
modern life ensure that there will be no massive ‘going back’ to premarital chastity 
and buttoned-up cardigans as envisioned by professional virgin Wendy Shalit.’”30 As 
these shows have continued to grow in popularity and spread across the country,31 it 
is only further evidence that “boomers like Pollitt seem to expect young women to 
dress revealingly, and this expectation gets annoying after a while.”32 “Because they 
have real goals to achieve,” young women who participate in these shows don’t “want 
fashion to be the beginning and end of her self-definition.”33 Shalit argues this rift 
between the older and younger generations of women is evidence of the failings of 
second- and third-wave feminism. 
These girls, and others like them, are the “rebellious good girls.”34 “Perhaps,” 
Shalit speculates, “a new fourth wave of feminism really will take off, led by teen 
feminists such as Léa Clermont-Dion and the Girlcott girls. It will be a movement 
that is pro-women but at the same time holds up high sexual standards…perhaps 
when these young women are older, they will simply cease to identify as feminists 
because the leadership cannot accommodate them.”35 By arguing for founders’ intent, 
Shalit has appropriated a former enemy, feminism, and aligned it with modesty. 
Rather than being subsumed under current feminist ideology, these young women 
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signal a clear break, seeking to enact the liberation in a way that would have won the 
approval of the modest first-wavers. 
Dissociating Second and Third-wave feminism from Liberation 
 With this appeal to the founders of feminism, Shalit argued that the fourth-
wavers were getting back to the original spirit of feminism: liberation with dignity. 
However, in doing so, Shalit also had to show why other feminisms were not able to 
meet this standard. As in A Return to Modesty, Shalit seeks to dissociate feminism 
from liberation, and show that it is really inadequate and unresponsive to the 
problems that women face. As feminism is now part of her defense of modesty, she is 
now more focused in her criticism than before. This time, it is the feminism espoused 
by second- and third-wave feminists that threatens modesty. Ultimately, the ideology 
offered within second and third-wave feminism cannot achieve liberation for women 
because they reject the moral principles of the first wave. 
The feminists who emerged in the 1960s “were hostile to the idea of modesty 
or ‘hang-ups,’ which they perceived as a tool of patriarchal oppression.”36  While 
there were feminists opposed to pornography, Shalit claims, “they invariably said 
their problem was that porn ‘discriminated’ against women or that porn was ‘hate 
speech’—never that it violated our dignity as human beings.”37 These second-wave 
feminists are still around; many in leadership positions tend “to be vehemently 
opposed to the very moral message that the younger feminists espouse.”38  This is a 
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problem because what second-wave feminists want cannot be achieved, in Shalit’s 
view, without advocating for what second-wave feminists have fought against for 
years. She explains:  
[O]n the NOW website, one of the “misconceptions” supposedly 
leading to a bad body image is “the notion that women embody 
goodness and purity.” This is a standard feminist line. Yet the site 
also puts forth another view, that it is against “the sexualization of 
girls’ bodies at a very young age.” Well, there is a real tension 
between these two beliefs. If you want to fight the sexualization of 
girls’ bodies and you want to do it effectively, then you have to allow 
for a concept of wholesomeness and a certain internal focus.39 
If second-wave feminists have immobilized themselves through their own ideology, 
third-wave feminism does not offer women much more. For example, their attempts 
to “undermine gender stereotypes” by embracing “public sexuality” through 
pornography or CAKE parties40 fail to impress “men—untroubled by having anything 
to prove—[who] seem to be hanging on to a basic modicum of modesty.”41 If 
anything positive is to be said about “fluffy, ‘girlie’ feminists” typical of the third 
wave, it is that they “are tolerant in both directions, something that can hardly be said 
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of their predecessors,”42 like Germaine Greer, Simone de Beauvoir, and Betty 
Friedan, who vehemently attacked marriage, motherhood, and housewives.43 
This third-wavers’ respect for different beliefs “was a refreshing development 
for feminism,” which “just may be what opened the door to younger women [with] 
their more traditional concept of keeping sexuality significant.”44 Still, though, as the 
“third-wavers continue to advocate a public, crude sexuality and younger girls feel 
oppressed by how public sexuality is,” an ideological rift which puts these two 
generations on “an inevitable collision.”45 The third wave advocacy of a public 
sexuality cannot be reconciled with the fourth wave values of morality and modesty. 
In order to strengthen her case for fourth-wave feminism, Shalit dissociated 
second- and third-wave feminism from liberation. She focused on the inadequacy of 
second- and third-wave feminism, arguing that it has been unresponsive to the needs 
of women. This strategy enabled Shalit to redraw the grounds from which she argues 
for modesty. Furthermore, even though third-wave feminism is tolerant of most forms 
of feminism, these new feminists cannot be accommodated within the third wave. By 
dissociating second and third-wave feminism from liberation, Shalit offers the fourth 
wave of feminism as the best way to achieve liberation as the first wave intended. 
Abandoning Sexism and Essentialism 
Within this new book, Shalit had to overcome multiple objections to her 
argument. As stated in chapter three, A Return to Modesty offered a very provocative 
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answer to women’s problems, in that society is in need of a “good dose of sexism.” 
This was defined as an essentialist understanding of men and women’s natures, and 
evidenced through practices that are rooted in this understanding, such as modest 
dress or various religious practices. In doing so, Shalit hoped to redefine sexism as a 
positive, rather than an oppressive, force.  
This argument, which was central to her first book, is absent in Girls Gone 
Mild. Shalit completely drops the use of sexism as part of her argument. In the entire 
book, it is referenced three times, always in the context of quotations from others. In 
these instances, sexism bears the negative connotations that Shalit worked to correct 
in A Return to Modesty, but here, she does not seek to dissociate sexism from this 
repressive definitions. For example, “Instead, our public debate always ends in 
semantics. Katie Roiphe dismisses coeds who say they feel ‘defiled’ and ‘I long to be 
innocent again.’ (She says these women are using ‘an outdated, sexist 
vocabulary.’)”46  Another example: “‘Give me something to scream about!’ is just 
what Abercrombie & Fitch did for twenty-four young girls after releasing a line of 
female T-shirts containing this sexually charged phrase along with some other sexist 
and racist messages, including, ‘Who needs brains when you have these?’”47 Finally, 
“Giving me a withering look, a forty-two-year-old lawyer barks, ‘I am very 
suspicious of telling girls they need to be morally good. That’s sexism right there!’”48  
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Shalit does not argue for sexism at all in Girls Gone Mild because sexism is 
fundamentally incompatible with feminism, a conservative argument that would be at 
odds with the progressive rhetoric offered through “fourth-wave feminism.” As stated 
in chapter three, Shalit seeks to associate sexism with liberation through conservative 
religious practices, such as Jewish or Islamic traditions. But without these religious 
examples, arguing for sexism as a positive becomes very difficult, especially when 
employing a vocabulary of feminism. As Shalit has adopted feminism within Girls 
Gone Mild, advocating for sexism would seem to be a rhetorically incompatible 
strategy. It is also important to note that Shalit no longer relies upon abstract, 
idealized language. In A Return to Modesty, she described modesty as a reflection of 
true womanhood: a natural instinct that is a reflection of innocence and Eros. Yet this 
language of transcendent womanliness is absent from Girls Gone Mild. Since arguing 
for a real definition of modesty is no longer the issue for Shalit, this Platonic language 
no longer is appropriate in arguing for fourth-wave feminism.  
Overcoming the Limitations of A Return to Modesty and the Limitations of 
Founders’ Intent 
Shalit’s assessment of our culture in Girls Gone Mild resonated well with 
many reviewers. As Deborah Siegel noted, her bubbe [grandmother] would have said 
in response to Girls Gone Mild, “what’s there to disagree?”49 Indeed, in the face of 
mild critique and diverse support for Girls Gone Mild, it would seem as though 
Shalit’s argument for founders’ intent was a strategic move that made her argument 
                                                 
49
 Deborah Siegel, "Unrequited Love: Musings on Girls Gone Mild," The American Prospect  (2007), 
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=unrequited_love. 
82 
 
 
far more palatable to her audience. Girls Gone Mild overcame two major limitations 
of A Return to Modesty: first, by arguing for modesty through fourth-wave feminism 
she was able to make it more appealing to a wider audience. Second, by abandoning 
the transcendent language of real definitions, reviewers could not accuse her of 
essentializing women. 
Whereas the conservative religious examples Shalit employed within A Return 
to Modesty did not appeal to many reviewers, her appeal to first wave feminism 
seemed to resonate as an appealing conceptualization of modesty. Many reviewers 
were enthusiastic about these new fourth wavers. Like one reviewer on amazon.com 
stated, “this ‘fourth-wave feminism,’” is a “much better, truer, and healthier feminism 
than what we have seen in the past few years,” and is something that she could 
readily identify as.50 Another reviewer responded to the promise of liberation within 
fourth-wave feminism, saying that choosing modesty in the face of contemporary 
sexual ethics “incur[s] the ridicule and wrath of one’s peers and of many soi-disant 
[so-called or pretended] feminists” such that the idea of liberation becomes a 
mockery.51 If this is a “truer” version of feminism, Shalit certainly seems to have 
struck a chord in offering modesty as feminism. Even though, as one reviewer 
remarked, Shalit is an “Orthodox Jew,” the book is “written to the general 
population,” indicating that her religious beliefs are evident, but are not the sole 
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source for her argument.52 Another reviewer noted the same; Shalit’s “perspective is 
inherently religious and conservative, but [appreciated that] this book makes sense,” 
regardless of religious or political bent.53 Another reviewer, “Grace Leigh,” remarked 
on this broad appeal, stating, “Shalit is clearly in tune to today’s trends and the 
mindset of our nation’s young women…[she] not only inspires young women to take 
on more positive roles in their own lives, [but] she provides them with the means and 
the motivation to do so.”54 Obviously, modesty as fourth-wave feminism resonated 
beyond cultural or religious constraints.  
The second limitation that Shalit overcame is noticeable only in its absence. 
As stated earlier, Shalit abandoned her advocacy for sexism, along with the 
essentialized, Platonic language she used to describe modesty. Reviewers of A Return 
to Modesty questioned Shalit’s stereotype of women and the power of modesty to 
prevent rape and sexual harassment (see pages 60-66), a reaction to the idealized 
language with which Shalit described modesty. However, by redefining modesty in 
her appeal to the founders’ intent of feminism, she was able to skirt the trap of 
Platonism, in that “metaphysical absolutism fails to account for the variability of 
human experience.”55 By redefining modesty not as a transcendent quality of women, 
but rather as the “guiding spirit” behind the first wave of feminism, Shalit’s argument 
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gained a material substance, one that resonated with reviewers far more than the 
immateriality she had previously arguing for in A Return to Modesty. 
Some of the issues that reviewers had with A Return to Modesty seemed to 
have evaporated with Girls Gone Mild, not to mention the distinct lack of the fiery 
criticism that often defined reviews that followed A Return to Modesty. However, like 
arguing for real definitions, it is important to note that the same strategies utilized 
when arguing for founders’ intent also proved to be limitations to her argument. First, 
Shalit’s attempts to dissociate second and third-wave feminism from positive 
connotations did not resonate with some reviewers. Second, critics believed Shalit 
was “cherry picking” her examples to best suit her case. Finally, some reviewers 
found that Shalit’s advice for fourth wavers seemed to be far too mild for the rebels 
Shalit was trying to encourage. 
The first rhetorical limitation was Shalit’s inability to fully dissociate second 
and third-wave feminism from liberation. Shalit places much of the blame upon 
second- and third-wave feminism, but as Siegel said, “Blaming feminism for the evil 
du jour is a lazy reflex, a formula so familiar that by now it's cliché.”56 “Caricaturing 
feminist leaders, overestimating the strength of the “feminist establishment,” allowed 
Shalit, in the opinion of this reviewer, to ignore the wide varieties of feminists and 
feminism, and construct third wavers as “‘sex-positive’” or “‘emotionally 
repressed.’”57 Seigel ruminated on this schism Shalit constructs between fourth-wave 
feminism and older feminists, saying, “At 38, I sometimes identify as third-wave, and 
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I have yet to collide with one of Shalit's rebellious young good girls. But would said 
meeting really constitute such a clash? Her good girl and I would likely agree on 
much.”58 Another reviewer, Jennifer Howard, also noted that Shalit had a perception 
of older feminists that was not rooted in reality. “These are the good ladies,” she 
observed, “who run organizations such as NOW and who have fought for years to 
give women the same chances as men—not, as Shalit would have it, just the chance 
to sleep around like men.”59 By pitting second and third-wave feminism constantly 
against fourth-wave feminism, some reviewers felt that Shalit misrepresented 
feminism and missed an opportunity to build alliances between the factions. 
Laura Kipnis criticized Shalit for citing feminist as the troublemakers, “who 
persuaded women to sleep around,” but, she continues, “it turns out that the blame for 
bad sex goes to bad mother carting around antiquated ideas about liberation.”60 “It’s 
Shalit who really delivers a spanking to mom,” because these women, who grew up 
with the sexual liberation of the 1960s, now have daughters of their own, they’re 
passing irresponsible ethics on to the next generation.61 Shalit’s attempt to “blame 
this hypersexual culture on lenient Boomer parents” was not persuasive for Siegel 
either, who argues that “in the world of Girls Gone Mild, permissive Boomer parents 
are lumped together with third-wave feminists to become the dread ‘them,’ the dark 
side of the moral universe.”62 This split between boomers and their progeny is a 
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rather incredible situation for these reviewers, who do not see a parent-child conflict 
as Shalit does. 
Once again, some reviewers found Shalit’s reasoning circular, proving to be 
the second major limitation to her argument. As Tim Challies observed, Shalit drew 
“upon over 100 in-depth interviews and thousands of email exchanges with women 
from ages twelve to twenty eight,” from a variety of ideological and religious 
backgrounds.63  But despite the volume of material, reviewers often expressed 
skepticism as to their representative nature. For instance, Jennifer Howard asked, 
“how real is the sexed-out, I Am Charlotte Simmons world Shalit describes?”64 She 
agrees that sex is certainly ubiquitous, as Shalit points out, but in her use of studies, 
she neglects to discuss their methods; therefore, “as long as they support [Shalit’s] 
conclusions, they must be sound.” Sarah Hetherington makes a similar observation in 
her careful review. “Shalit does describe very skillfully the ‘self-actualization through 
badness’ that she sees as subtly encoded by popular culture,” she said, but “Shalit’s 
choice of examples is uneven.”65 When she “clumsily lumps [an] egregious case of 
criminality together with much more useful examples…the result of the juxtaposition 
is to make the more effective parts of Shalit’s argument difficult to swallow.”66 
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Hetherington observed that while the sexualization of women in the pages of Jane is 
one thing, comparing this to criminal sex cases involving minors is another.67 
Elizabeth Nickson also doubted whether this new feminism was really as large 
as Shalit portrayed, or in fact if it really was a new kind of feminism.68 Just as Katha 
Pollitt criticized A Return to Modesty (“...she declares a modestynik ‘epidemic’ and 
invites the reader to wonder, ‘Why would so many young women be adopting 
modesty as the new sexual virtue?’ So many? How many? Ten? Ten thousand?”),69 
Kerry Howley suspected that Shalit might be inflating numbers to further her 
argument in Girls Gone Mild and goes so far as to say, “This would seem to be 
Shalit’s modus operandi: Choose an unusually sexually progressive pocket of 
American culture, declare it indicative rather than exceptional, and launch a 
heroically irrelevant crusade for change.”70 Other reviewers also suspected that 
Shalit’s interviewers were “hand-picked to embody certain pre-programmed 
extremes,” as reviewer Ellie Reasoner on amazon.com suspected, but this did not 
prevent her from being persuaded by other arguments that Shalit made.71  Kipnis was 
also dubious of the novelty of this fourth wave of feminism. “Shalit says there’s a 
grassroots modesty campaign under way,” a movement that she started, an “embattled 
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heroine” fighting for modesty.72 But, she asked, “how embattled can she be when her 
views are the official views of the current administration?”73 If feminism is supposed 
to subvert dominant structures, this congruency shared with conservatives may lose 
her credibility, as it did in the eyes of some reviewers.  
Finally, the advice Shalit had for young readers provided the third rhetorical 
limitation to her work. If this “fourth-wave feminism” is supposed to be “the biggest 
shakeup of feminism since Seneca Falls in 1848,” the modesty she advocated did not 
always seem consistent with revolutionary liberation. While Shalit was writing 
ostensibly to inform as well as encourage young women, “the author steadily 
undermines her own purpose,” noted Hetherington, “beginning with the book’s very 
title.”74 While it is obvious that Shalit is spoofing the infamous “Girls Gone Wild,” 
but by simply replacing “wild” with “mild,” Shalit “loses focus and 
persuasiveness.”75 In effect, Shalit limits her ability to build upon modesty as a truly 
powerful force. Hetherington observed, “so wary is Shalit of borrowing terms from 
women’s liberation advocates of the 1960s that she misses the opportunity to 
emphasize building self-esteem apart from—rather than in simple opposition to—
such detrimental influences as Girls Gone Wild.”76 
Similarly, Pia Catton, a Wall Street Journal reviewer, said that “Girls Gone 
Mild loses some of its own force when it moves from reportorial survey to advice and 
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advocacy.”77 Her review noted that the “how to” advice sections at the end of each 
chapter, aimed at instructing young readers in confronting liberal parents or modest 
fashion, may not have packed the punch Shalit intended, especially “A Recipe for 
Pleasing With Integrity,” which gave a recipe for homemade apple pie. This did not 
strike Catton as especially powerful, as “one would certainly like to see a return to 
time-honored ideas of goodness…But something is needed beyond such self-help 
advice and spirited cheerleading.”78 Shalit responded directly to this criticism, stating 
that the recipe was “a joke!”79 Joke or not, Hetherington observed that this example 
was “not only unfunny, but also disappointing, and will serve as Exhibit A for those 
who want to dismiss Shalit’s point of view,”80 as it did for Kerry Howley, who stated, 
“I would almost certainly be more impressed with scolds if they stuck to baking 
pies.”81  
Despite these reservations, it is clear that these criticisms were couched in 
milder language and far less severe than those that were elicited by A Return to 
Modesty. Shalit clearly negotiated many of the limitations that arose in response to A 
Return to Modesty. By basing her argument for modesty in a principled defence of 
first wave feminism, she could offer modesty as a new wave, a new rebellion for 
women. 
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Conclusion 
 In a sense, Shalit’s purpose for A Return to Modesty and Girls Gone Mild was 
one and the same. She sought to show that popular forms of feminism failed to grant 
empowerment and promote modesty as a better option, or at least another option, as a 
curative for the ills facing women today. However, her rhetorical strategy in Girls 
Gone Mild marks a radical departure. Whereas she had first advocated for a return to 
the modesty of yesteryear by arguing for real definitions in A Return to Modesty, 
Shalit redefined modesty within a revolutionary and progressive women’s movement 
by arguing for founders’ intent in Girls Gone Mild. Whether or not this was a choice 
made in direct reaction to the hard-hitting criticism of A Return to Modesty, it is 
certain that this choice was strategic and advantageous, as criticism for Girls Gone 
Mild was, quite frankly, just that: mild. 
 After analysis of these two works and audience reactions, it becomes clear 
that Shalit is nearly always operating through some mode of redefinition. In A Return 
to Modesty, she invites the reader to consider sexism not as repressive, but really as 
understanding men and women in terms of their essential qualities. Modesty is not 
meekness, but really empowerment. Later, in Girls Gone Mild, she says modesty is 
feminism as the first wave intended. With this in mind, I will spend the final chapter 
assessing this strategy in context of the argumentative theory of definition.  
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Chapter 5 
Modesty for the Masses: Implications and Conclusion 
 
In a rather serendipitous last line of A Return to Modesty, Shalit writes, “I 
don’t see why our parents should get to have a monopoly on sexual revolutions.”1 Of 
course, it is difficult to have a revolution in a Western society when advocating for 
sexism. As one of her informants stated in Girls Gone Mild, “both feminist groups 
and conservative groups are limited in terms of how much they can help young 
people”: feminism seems to have embraced the very misogyny that it is supposed to 
fight, and conservative attempts to restore decency would “be immediately 
discredited.”2 
Perhaps Shalit realized that if she wanted a revolution, she needed a vehicle 
for her argument that had the potential to be revolutionary. By arguing for founders’ 
intent, Shalit seems to have found a way to negotiate the “definition-less” state of 
feminism and her belief in the essential character of women. Despite the ostensible 
performative contradiction of maligning and then appropriating feminism for her 
defense of modesty, it appears to have garnered a favorable response from her 
audience. Arguing for founders’ intent served as a fitting rhetorical strategy in 
overcoming limitations to A Return to Modesty for several reasons. First, given the 
fractured feminism of the time, appealing to the first wave of feminism gave Shalit a 
                                                 
1
 Shalit, A Return to Modesty: Discovering the Lost Virtue, 244. 
2
 ———, Girls Gone Mild: Young Women Reclaim Self-Respect and Find It's Not Bad to Be Good, 
237. 
92 
 
   
 
principled means by which to appropriate feminism. Because feminism is so 
fragmented and can now conceivably be practiced in almost any fashion, Shalit could 
have appealed to the tolerance of the third-wave feminisms to include modesty as just 
another feminism. However, because her conceptualization of modesty is so different 
from the dominant “bad girl” feminism that she construes as second and third wave, 
Shalit would have weakened her position if she had simply tried to make modesty just 
another part of the third wave. Shalit chose to appropriate feminism using founders’ 
intent, in that modesty achieves liberation consistent with the practices and aims of 
first wave feminists. Even after three waves of feminism, Shalit viewed the first wave 
as the authority and standard of women’s liberation. The activism and moral 
standards of the first wave feminists displayed, in Shalit’s understanding, a 
“superiority” which “best incarnates the essence” of women’s liberation.3 That, in 
part, is what separates the fourth wave from previous feminisms. In calling modesty 
“fourth-wave feminism,” Shalit aimed to appropriate the authority of the original 
feminist movement, as well as draw a distinction between these feminists and those 
who identify as second or third wave. 
Second, arguing for founders’ intent gave Shalit’s ideology a material, versus 
abstract, locus. Within her first book, modesty is defined through the ideal abstract: 
modesty is the essential character of woman, her innocence, feminine vulnerability, 
and eroticism. In order to represent this, Shalit strove to demonstrate how sexism and 
modesty were much more beneficial for women than what some feminists offer as 
                                                 
3
 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, 95. 
93 
 
   
 
liberation through examples from history and conservative religious practices. 
However, despite her efforts to dissociate negative connotations from sexist practices, 
headscarves are not liberating to a secular Western audience. As evident from the 
reviews, her audience simply could not divorce these practices from the cultures they 
are a part of, contexts that are viewed as very un-liberating to a large part of Shalit’s 
audience. By arguing for founders’ intent in Girls Gone Mild, Shalit was able to root 
her conservative ideology in American history and in a movement associated with 
liberation. Rather than focus on the ineffable essences of womanhood, Shalit’s focus 
shifted to something much more concrete: a particular incarnation of feminism, as 
enacted by real people. If, Shalit argues, feminism is about women’s liberation, one 
must ask what liberation really looks like. Is it the woman stripping for the Girls 
Gone Wild crew during spring break who best enacts feminism, or is more like the 
moral crusades of the first wave feminists who fought for legal and civic recognition 
of personhood? While today’s woman has the right to vote, the right to own property, 
and the right to be bad, the right to be good must be reclaimed. Whereas Shalit had 
previously rooted liberation in some rather extreme examples of Islamic veiling, 
Jewish law, and conservative customs of times past, by relying upon the first-wavers’ 
fight for suffrage, civic recognition, and temperance, she was able to present an 
example that was liberating in a secular sense, yet still embodied her conservative 
conceptualization of modesty. In effect, modesty was transformed to fit the masses, 
making it much more accessible to audience who may have been unfamiliar with, or 
hostile to, sexist conservative religious practices. 
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As stated earlier, arguing for founders’ intent is similar to, but critically 
different from, arguing for real definitions. Arguing for founder’s intent is different 
from real definitions in that it holds that the ideal is not an immaterial essence or 
nature, but instead based in a material origin. The focus on the first wave of feminism 
helped to ground Shalit’s defense of modesty in a real time and place and also gave 
her a vocabulary that resonated with a secular audience. However, arguing for 
founders’ intent also bears some similarities to arguing for real definitions, 
similarities which are evidenced in the limitations of this strategy. Criticism was far 
less severe to Girls Gone Mild, but some of the criticism was grounded in the same 
language as before. In a sense, Shalit continued to argue for an ideal. The search for 
an ideal, even a material one, may lead to the perception that the rhetor has ignored 
counterexamples or has over-idealized the locus of quality or essence. Thus, when 
arguing for real definitions, as when arguing for founders’ intent, there is a risk that 
an audience may view the rhetor’s examples as “cherry picking,” selectively choosing 
examples to fit their definitions. Accusations of circular reasoning were evident in 
reviews for both A Return to Modesty and Girls Gone Mild. A rhetor’s efforts at 
dissociation may also fail for an audience, another criticism that arose in response 
both books. When arguing for real definitions or for founders’ intent, a rhetor must 
dissociate what he or she believes is a misunderstanding from a particular word: “X is 
really Y; it only appears to be not-Y.”4 If dissociation is successful, those old 
connotations will be abandoned in favor of the rhetor’s argument. When Shalit argued 
                                                 
4
 Schiappa, Defining Reality: Definitions and the Politics of Meaning, 37. 
95 
 
   
 
for a real definition of sexism, she encountered the same resistance as when she tried 
to argue that second and third wave feminist ideology are not really in-step with what 
feminism should be. Her conceptualization of headscarves as liberating or third-wave 
feminism as oppressive simply did not resonate with some members of the audience. 
Similarly, demonizing second and third-wave feminisms in broad strokes through 
stereotypes did not reflect the views of some in her audience. 
Future Research Directions 
This thesis encompasses a considerable amount of material, and I believe that 
my examination of Shalit’s work offers a satisfying solution to her paradoxical 
success. While my work covers much of Shalit’s material, there is even more room 
for further analysis. I examine the development and evolution of Shalit’s argument 
over the course of her two books, which I believe extends even further. In July 2008, 
a paper-back edition of Girls Gone Mild was re-released with a different title and 
cover photo. Although there were no significant changes to the text, the change in 
title and cover photo may represent Shalit’s appropriation and modification of 
feminism even further. Whereas both A Return to Modesty and Girls Gone Mild 
depict a woman holding an apple, the cover of the new edition depicts a young 
woman boldly leaping against a blue sky. Furthermore, the title changed from Girls 
Gone Mild: Young Women Reclaim Self-Respect and Find It's Not Bad to Be Good to 
The Good Girl Revolution: Young Rebels with Self-Esteem and High Standards. 
While small, I believe this change is a response to the criticism Shalit received, as far 
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as becoming more consistent with the feminist argument she adopted in Girls Gone 
Mild.  
Also, I believe there is an argument to be made about the visual rhetoric of 
these three books. The cover pictures of both A Return to Modesty and Girls Gone 
Mild seem to offer a strikingly similar argument: “Eve” holding the apple. Examining 
the connotations and representation of ideology within the choice of these pictures 
would offer another perspective to Shalit’s argument, one that I think is an attempt to 
reflect the shift from sexism to feminism that occurs within the text. 
In the middle of Girls Gone Mild, Shalit states, “Today it’s fashionable to 
malign the modest woman as a ‘pleaser’ of the ‘patriarchy,’” adding that the typical 
criticism includes accusations of “pliable, obsequious, sycophantic, servile.” 
However, she wonders, “how pliable can modesty be,” especially when it means 
setting limits and high standards for oneself?5 This argument is constant throughout 
both Girls Gone Mild and A Return to Modesty, but it is the way in which she chose 
to argue for this position, though, that differed wildly. It is one thing to frame this 
argument within conservative rhetoric: portraying a modest woman as one who 
rejects contemporary “feminist” society and reverts to strict religious practices or 
pining for long-gone Victorian customs. And as Shalit surely understood, it is 
something else to frame modesty as a very feminist idea: a rebellious recovery of first 
wave feminism that recognizes the individuality and dignity of women.  
 
                                                 
5
 Shalit, Girls Gone Mild: Young Women Reclaim Self-Respect and Find It's Not Bad to Be Good, 203. 
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